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D.: Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Cons

Notes
FAILING TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION:
BREEDING A VIABLE AND CONSISTENT
"STATE-CREATED DANGER" ANALYSIS FOR
ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS UNDER SECTION 1983
"Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges having ears to
hear,hear not .... 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In certain limited circumstances, a state actor can be found to have a
constitutional duty to protect citizens from injuries inflicted by private
persons. 2 To illustrate such circumstances, consider the following two
hypothetical situations. First, a delusional crack addict known as "MC"
had been terrorizing a neighborhood through vandalism and random
physical beatings. 3 In the course of his terrorism, MC often carried a
loaded handgun and threatened residents with it.
Local law
enforcement was well aware of MC's dangerous propensities.
Unfortunately, so was Mary Wells. Mary was a resident of this
neighborhood and often found herself terrorized and threatened by MC.
Mary had notified the police of this menace during four separate 911
calls over the course of three months.
Although Mary always gave the responding police officers the
location of MC's hideout, a well-known crack house down the block, the
officers would always refuse to look into the matter. Instead, the
responding officers would routinely state, "We don't have time to
babysit you-you won't get hurt or shot by MC." The officers never
exited their squad cars during their brief, five-minute visits. Tragically,
MC shot Mary shortly after the fourth 911 call she had placed for police
assistance.

1

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1871).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
3
This first scenario is loosely based upon Walker v. City of Gary, a pending § 1983 civil
rights suit in the Lake Superior Court, located in Lake County, Gary, Indiana.
2
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In another matter, Robert and Michelle Jones were driving home
from a New Year's Eve party through a dangerous part of the city. 4
Robert had consumed large quantities of alcoholic beverages earlier that
evening. A police officer pulled the vehicle over and eventually arrested
Robert for driving under the influence of alcohol. As a result, Robert
became belligerent, and the officer took Robert to the police station to be
processed. The officer also had Robert's vehicle towed away. Before
leaving, the officer told Michelle that she would be picked up by another
officer within the hour. However, no such officer showed up, and
Michelle was brutally raped by a roving street gang twenty minutes
later.
Can the police officers in these two hypotheticals be held liable for
the injuries inflicted by the respective third parties? Ultimately, the
answer to this question depends on the interpretation of the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.5 In DeShaney, the Court hinted in dicta that
a constitutional claim may exist under § 1983 for the failure of a state
actor to protect an individual from the violence of a third party.6 After
DeShaney was handed down, the federal circuit courts termed this
concept the "state-created danger" theory. 7 Although DeShaney is
credited with developing the danger creation concept, the case gives
slight shrift to such an analysis. 8 Currently, there is a lack of uniformity
among the federal circuits as to the legitimacy and contours of this
theory. 9
This Note critically analyzes the current status of the state-created
danger theory, focusing on the debilitating effects of the intercircuit and
intracircuit conflicts surrounding it.1° Part II presents a brief background

4
This scenario is based upon similar facts found in Hillard v. City & County of Denver,
930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991).
5
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6
Id. at 201. The soon to be created "state-created danger" theory emanates from the
following dicta in DeShaney: "While the State may have been aware of the dangers that
Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to
render him any more vulnerable to them." Id. Therefore, if a state actor played a role in
the creation of the danger, he or she may face liability under § 1983. Id.
7
See infra Part III (discussing treatment of the state-created danger concept by the
federal circuit courts).
8
See infra Part IV (analyzing the various intercircuit and intracircuit inconsistencies
surrounding the state-created danger concept).
9
See infra Parts III, IV (illustrating the lack of uniformity within the circuits).
10 See infra Part IV for a critical analysis of the state-created danger concept.
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examining the theory of government liability under § 1983.11 Part III
presents a sampling of how the federal circuit courts have generally
12
treated the state-created danger concept in various factual scenarios.
Part IV makes a critical analysis of the various tests by exposing some of
the more prominent intercircuit and intracircuit inconsistencies
surrounding the theory.' 3 To unify the conflicting state-created danger
tests, Part V of this Note proposes a model judicial test that is consistent
with § 1983's legislative history, prior Supreme Court precedent, and
circuit caselaw. 14 Significantly, the model judicial test should resolve the
varying degrees of inconsistencies among the federal circuits and offers
an expansive approach to the state-created danger concept.' 5 Finally,
Part V will recommend that the Supreme Court revisit DeShaney and set
16
the contours of the rights within the state-created danger concept.
II.
A.

THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY SEEDS ARE PLANTED

The Theory of Government Liability Under § 1983

The Fourteenth Amendment 17 and 42 U.S.C. § 198318 impose liability
when a person deprives another of a constitutional right while acting
11

See infra Part II (discussing § 1983's legislative history and DeShaney).
See discussion infra Part III. This Part discusses the federal circuits that recognize the
state-created danger theory as a viable legal claim and those circuits that refuse to accept
the theory.
13
See discussion infra Part IV. Based on DeShaney's famous dicta, this Part will
demonstrate that the conflicting tests produce vast distortions within § 1983 jurisprudence.
14
See discussion infra Part V.B. By way of preview, the model test provides a single,
uniform framework for addressing whether a state actor can be held liable under the statecreated danger theory.
15
See infra Part V.D (discussing the implications of the suggested expansive approach to
state-created danger claims).
16
See infra Part V (discussing the recommended approach to state-created danger
claims).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdictions the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see also 1 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:16 (West 2000). Professors Bodensteiner and
Levinson have commented on the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Although literally the clause appears to provide only "procedural"
protection, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the clause
contains a substantive element as well. There are three aspects to
12
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"under color of a [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage." 19 In order to state a valid claim under § 1983, an injured party
must prove: (1) deprivation of a right secured by the United States
Constitution; (2) deprivation by a party acting "under color" of state law;
and (3) state action. 20 However, § 19 83's statutory scheme does not
create any per se substantive rights.21 Rather, § 1983 acts as a conduit
through which injured persons can seek relief for violations of their
substantive rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution or
federal statutes. 22

substantive due process. First, it protects the enumerated rights (Bill of
Rights) from State interference. Second, it provides the source for
protecting certain, unenumerated, nontextual yet fundamental rights
from interference by government absent compelling justification.
Third, it more generally prohibits arbitrary abuses of government
power even in the absence of a fundamental right.
BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra.

18

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.

Id.
19

Id.

20

Id.

See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
2
See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 17, § 1:01. Professors Bodensteiner and
Levinson make the following observation:
Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights. Rather, it provides a
cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.
Therefore, plaintiffs suing under Section 1983 must point to another
source, either the United States Constitution or federal statutes, for the
substantive rights they seek to enforce.
Id.; Steven H. Steinglass, An Introduction to State Court § 1983 Litigation, in SWORD & SHIELD

21

REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 89 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998)

("Courts and litigants often assert that defendants have or alleged to have 'violated § 1983.'
There is no such thing as 'violations of § 1983,' however, and it is a misnomer to make such
references."); Christina M. Madden, Signs of Danger-The Third Circuit Emphasizes
Foreseeability As the Crucial Element In the "State-Created Danger" Theory: Morse v. Lower
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It is important to note that the essence of the present-day § 1983 has
a solid historical foundation. 23 The Forty-Second Congress enacted
§ 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was passed along
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 The Act, popularly
known as the "Ku Klux Klan Act," was enacted primarily as a reaction to
the growing terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Civil War South. 25
Although the Act was partially intended to prevent malicious behavior
committed by the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers, Congress' more
important concern was providing a specific federal remedy for the
unauthorized conduct of state officials who frequently failed or refused
to protect the federal rights of blacks in the post-Civil War South. 26
Congressional debates over the Act's bill clearly disclose that
Congress was concerned with the inaction of state and local governments
and that Congress sought to enact a bill of broad scope to cope with the
problem of the nonadministration of law. 27 These extensive and

Merion School District, 43 VILL. L. REV. 947, 951 (1998) ("[S]ection 1983 serves as a vehicle
through which plaintiffs can obtain relief for violations of their substantive rights provided
by either the Constitution or federal statutes.").
23 See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text for a historical account of § 1983.
24 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-76 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (reviewing the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871).
25 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 667 (stating that the suppression of Ku Klux Klan terrorism was
the subject of almost all congressional debate); see also Ashley Smith, Students Hurting
Students: Who Will Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1997). Smith notes the following two
goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1871:
Congress had two objectives in mind when it passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, § 1983's predecessor: First, to provide a mechanism for the
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment against the state; and
second, to suppress the violent action of the Ku Klux Klan. One of the
Act's purposes, then, is to provide litigants a federal remedy for
violations of their constitutional rights where state law, though
adequate in theory, is not available in actual practice.
Smith, supra.
26 Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989); see also William W. Watkinson, Note, Shades
of DeShaney: Official Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (1995). Watkinson argues that although the Act's language
was broad, "it was originally interpreted narrowly as a remedy for a specific problem,
namely 'the mistreatment of Southern blacks during Reconstruction.'" Watkinson, supra.
27 See generally United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (recognizing that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was more than a simple remedy; rather, it was a sweeping measure
aimed at redressing, inter alia, state "misuse of power"); Laura Oren, The State's Failure to
Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:DeShaney In Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 689 (1990).
Oren comments on the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Act by stating that
"[pirominent scholars and historians of the Reconstruction era also would agree that
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emotional debates were extremely passionate and emphasized the
failure to protect individuals' civil rights.28 For example, Representative
Perry cried, "Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges having ears,
hear not ... "29
Unfortunately, section 1 of the Act, now codified as the present-day
§ 1983, did little more than add civil remedies and penalties to the
30
criminal penalties already in place by the earlier 1866 Civil Rights Act.
For decades later, the spirit of what is currently § 1983 was largely
ignored through various restrictive judicial interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 31 It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court,

Congress and the courts were concerned about serious problems of private coercion,
intimidation, and violence directed against citizens." Oren, supra.
2
See Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1982).
29
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1871); see also Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76. The
Court emphasized that "[wihile one main scourge of the evil-perhaps the leading one-was
the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created [in § 1983] was not a remedy against it or its
members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
30
See Steinglass, supra note 22, at 85-86 (discussing the history of § 1983).
31 See RICHARD S. VACCA & H.C. HUDGINS, JR., LIABILITY OF SCHOOL OFFICIALS AND
ADMINISTRATORS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS TORTS 13 (1982). It has been noted that "[flor more than
seventy-five years, however, § 1983 was used very little, and lay virtually dormant in the
United States Code." Id. Indeed, "[flor many years, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
largely ignored; but, almost a century later, in 1961, the Monroe v. Pape decision initiated
what has resulted in two decades of increasing litigation against governmental officials and
governmental agencies." Id. at xi; Michael K. Cantwell, Constitutional Torts and the Due
Process Clause, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (1995) (noting that the "post Civil
War Supreme Court eviscerated the various Civil Rights Acts by narrowly interpreting the
authority granted Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment," and recognizing that § 1983
"lay dormant for nearly a century, until the landmark decision in Monroe v. Pape, in which
the Supreme Court held that the statute covered unauthorized as well as authorized actions
by state officials") (footnotes omitted); Michael G. Collins, Economic Rights, Implied
ConstitutionalActions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1498 (1989). Collins
argues
It is no secret that § 1983 was almost dead on arrival. It served as the
litigational vehicle for only a smattering of constitutional cases in its
first fifty years ....
Shortly after Congress enacted § 1983, the
Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, all but read the
privileges or immunities clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Collins, supra. But see United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 388 (1915). Writing for the
majority, Justice Holmes recognized that the intent of § 1983 was not restricted to the
terrorism created by the Klan. Id. Justice Holmes commented on section 6 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 in words relating to § 1983:
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment... was adopted with a view to the
protection of the colored race but has been found to be equally
important in its application to the rights of all, [§ 1983] had a general
scope and used general words that have become the most important
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in Monroe v. Pape,32 reevaluated its prior restrictive interpretations of
§ 1983 and recognized the original intent behind the statute.33 In
addition, the Court's subsequent opinion in Monell v. Department of Social
Services34 emphasized that § 1983 claims should receive a broad
interpretation in favor of plaintiffs bringing such actions. 35 Nonetheless,

now that the Ku Klux Klan have passed away .... We cannot allow the
past so far to affect the present as to deprive citizens of the United States of the
general protection which on its face [Section 1983] most reasonably affords.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Steinglass, supra note 22, at 85-86. Steinglass states that
"[b]efore Monroe, §1983 suits against state and local governmental defendants were
reluctantly rare because of the narrow construction given to § 1983 itself and because of the
existence of few constitutional limitations on the States." Id.
32 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
33

See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS

4849 (1983). According to Schuck,
In upholding Monroe's right to sue the policemen under § 1983, the
Court ensured that § 1983 would develop into a remedy of awesome
power ....
Monroe v. Pape was rightly perceived as a watershed
decision, establishing § 1983 as a potent remedy that citizens could
invoke affirmatively against official misconduct without the State's
help or indeed in the face of its opposition. It swiftly became the legal
bulwark of the ripening civil rights movement; only two years after the
decision, § 1983 litigation had grown by over 60 percent .... It was in
1980, however, that the scope of § 1983 reached its zenith.
Id.; Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships, Schools & the
Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97, 100 (1993) (stating that Monroe v. Pape "dramatically
increased the applicability of Section 1983").
34 436 U.S. 658, 684-85 (1978).
35 Id. at 685. The Court emphasized that "[in both Houses, statements of the supporters
of § 1 [of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 corroborated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended
to give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Id.; see also Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959 (1987), in A
SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY 186, 189 (Sheldon H. Nahmod ed., 1993) ("The
language of the provision, meanwhile, requires that it be applied broadly.") (emphasis
added); Marshall S. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
N.W. U. L. REV. 277 (1965), in A SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY 4, 5 (Sheldon H.

Nahmod ed., 1993) ("It is obvious from the words spoken on both sides [of the debate
surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871] that the framers contemplated a
bill of great scope."); David Pruessner, The Forgotten Foundation of State-Created Danger
Claims, 20 REV. LITIG. 357, 379 (2001) (recognizing that in Monell, the Court explicitly stated
that "§ 1983 is to be broadly construed because Congress intended an aggressive defense of
constitutional liberties").
Nichol also suggests that "[t]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act demands
that the statute be read to penetrate traditional concepts of state sovereignty." Nichol,
supra;see also Cantwell, supra note 31, at 318-19. Cantwell makes the following observation
regarding the historical construction of § 1983:
Critics also contended that an expansive construction of § 1983 would
offend federalism by intruding upon the sovereignty of the state-an
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since Monell, the Court once again narrowed § 1983's scope and
36
application.
Against this background, a legal concept, coined as the "statecreated danger" theory, would soon take root. 37 Unfortunately, the facts
and circumstances that spawned this § 1983 concept were no less tragic
than the unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the
38
widespread racial violence in the post-Civil War era.
B.

The Seed Is Planted: DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services

A § 1983 substantive due process claim against a state actor for
failure to protect a person from violence at the hands of private third
parties may exist under certain narrow circumstances. 39 In 1989, the
Supreme Court addressed whether a duty is owed by governmental

argument that was first raised during the floor debates in the FortySecond Congress. Now, as then, the answer is that federalism itself
was irrevocably transformed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
§ 1983 was intended "to interpose the federal courts between states
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."
Cantwell, supra note 31, at 318-19.
36 See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Limiting Federal Restrictions On State and Local Government, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 33 (1998). In his article, Professor Bodensteiner discusses the narrowing of
§ 1983's application and argues that Monroe v. Pape "gave reason for optimism that [this]
provision[] could live up to [its] promise and provide meaningful protection for civil
rights." Id. However, Professor Bodensteiner argues that "the Court has gradually eroded
them to the point where much of the promise now has a hollow ring for many victims of
official lawlessness." Id.; Collins, supra note 31, at 1537. The Court's current treatment of
§ 1983 claims is restrictive. Collins, supranote 31, at 1537. Indeed, it has been noted:
The honeymoon between the Court and § 1983, however, did not last
long. As the Court's composition shifted in the 1970s, so did its
attitude toward the statute and the individual rights it safeguarded.
Doctrines of equitable restraint, abstention, preclusion, and personal
and sovereign immunity all made resort to federal trial court more
difficult in § 1983 actions.
In addition, the Court showed its
restlessness with Monroe's state action holding that permitted litigants
to attack exercises of power that state or local law had not
affirmatively authorized.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37 See generally infra Part III for a survey of the different state-created danger tests.
3
See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text for a historical discussion of § 1983's
impact after the Civil War.
39 See Cantwell, supra note 31, at 330 ("Since the mid-1970s the Supreme Court has
steadily moved to narrow the availability of § 1983, first by examining the nature and
delineating the boundaries of substantive due process.., and then by defining the level of
government awareness required to trigger a constitutional 'deprivation.'").

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/3

D.: Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Cons

20021

STATE-CREATED DANGER

185

entities and their employees to protect persons from injuries caused by
40
private third parties.
In DeShaney, four-year old Joshua DeShaney and his mother brought
a § 1983 action against the Winnebago County Department of Social
Services ("DSS") for placing Joshua in his father's care. 41 The complaint
alleged that the DSS had deprived Joshua of due process of law by
failing to intervene and to protect him from violence perpetrated against
him by his father. 42 However, the Supreme Court rejected Joshua's claim
43
and affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court's opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that the DSS's failure to provide Joshua with adequate protection against
his father's child abuse did not violate Joshua's rights under the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 44 The Court noted the
tragedy inherent in the case but held that there is no substantive due
45
process right to protection from violence perpetrated by private actors.
The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause acts as a limitation on
46
state powers, not as a limitation on individual or private action.

See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Id. at 191-92. In DeShaney, the DSS received numerous complaints that Joshua was
being abused by his father. Id. at 192. The DSS took various steps to protect Joshua but did
not remove him from his father's custody. Id. In fact, the DSS obtained a court order
placing Joshua in the temporary custody of a hospital after the beatings. Id. However, the
DSS later released Joshua into his father's custody. Id. at 192-93. During the time Joshua
was in his father's custody, caseworkers made monthly visits to the DeShaney home and
observed suspicious injuries on Joshua's body. Id. at 193. Finally, the father beat Joshua so
severely that he suffered extensive and permanent brain damage. Id.
42
Id. Joshua's mother brought suit against the DSS under § 1983, claiming that Joshua
was denied liberty without due process of law because the DSS failed to intervene and
protect him from his father's abuse. Id. However, the district court granted summary
judgment for the DSS. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that local government does not have a duty to protect people from violence
committed by private actors. Id. Joshua's mother appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, and the Court granted certiorari. Id. at 194.
40
41

43

Id.

Id. at 195, 197.
Id. at 197 ("As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause.").
46
Id. at 195. The Court maintained that "[tihe [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security." Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that "[i]f the Due Process Clause does
not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows
44
45
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In addition, the Court rejected Joshua's argument that the State
acquired an affirmative duty to protect him from danger based on the
fact that it apparently had knowledge of his father's abusive
tendencies. 47 The Court emphasized that no duty of protection arises
unless "the state takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will." 48 However, the Court stated that "it is true that in
certain limited circumstances, the Constitution imposes upon the state
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular
individuals." 49 The Court expanded on its statement by proclaiming that
"the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the state's knowledge of
the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf."5 0 Since Joshua was not in state custody, the Court
held that the DSS was not liable for failing to intervene on his behalf. 51
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a powerful
dissenting opinion.5 2 Unlike the majority, which stressed that only
affirmative action by the state could be abusive, Justice Brennan
reasoned that inaction by the state could be just as abusive and
oppressive.5 3 Justice Brennan openly criticized the majority for making
an action-inaction distinction when deciding whether the Constitution
imposes an obligation upon the state to protect an individual from the

that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been
averted had it chosen to provide them." Id. at 196-97.
47
Id. at 198.
48
Id. at 199-200.
49
Id. at 198.
50
Id. at 200.
5'
Id. at 201. The Court stated that "the State does not become the permanent guarantor
of an individual's safety by having once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances,
the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua." Id.
52
Id. at 203 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Breaden Douthett, Comment, The Death of
ConstitutionalDuty: The Court Reacts to the Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 645 (1991).
Douthett observes that Justice Brennan "forcefully illustrated in his dissent that the line
between action and inaction [often will become] cloud[ed]." Douthett, supra.
53
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212. Justice Brennan stated that his "disagreement with the
Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as
action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it."
Id.; see also Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1529-30 (1989). Soifer observes that "the Court's response in
DeShaney is all too reminiscent of that moment in the first year of law school when a
student learns that there is no legal duty to rescue a baby drowning." Soifer, supra.
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harm of a third party.5 4 In short, Justice Brennan suggested that the
majority should have first focused on "the action that [the state] had
taken with respect to Joshua and children like him, rather than on the
55
action that the state failed to take."
III.

THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY TAKES ROOT IN THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT COURTS

Following the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney, the federal
circuit courts recognized two exceptions to DeShaney's canonical rule
that the Due Process Clause does not create an affirmative duty for state
actors to protect individuals from private third parties. 56 First, liability
can be imposed on a state actor when an actual custodial relationship
exists between a plaintiff and a state actor, also known as a "special
relationship."5 7 Second, liability can be imposed based on the state58
created danger theory.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 206. Justice Brennan stated that he was "unable to see... a neat
and decisive divide between action and inaction." Id.
55 Id. at 205. In addition, Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 212.
Justice Blackmun's dissent criticized the majority for using "sterile formalism" in deciding
such a tragic case. Id. Justice Blackmun stated that he would "adopt a 'sympathetic'
reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that
compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging." Id. at 213. Indeed, Justice
Blackmun's brief and overly compassionate dissent all but eulogized Joshua's unfortunate
situation. Id.; see also Jodie Stem, Comment, Young Lives Betrayed: DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1251, 1276-77 (1991). Stern
makes the following observation with regard to Justice Brennan's dissent in DeShaney:
Justice Brennan began his dissent by chiding the Majority for its
proclamation that the Constitution does not generally impose an
obligation upon the government to safeguard positive as well as
negative liberties ....
It was Justice Brennan's view that by
overemphasizing the action/inaction distinction, the Court failed to
give enough consideration to the effect of the State's actual
intervention into Joshua DeShaney's life.
Stem, supra.
56 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in
DeShaney).
57 See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995). The court noted that
the "special relationship" exception "only arises when a person is involuntarily confined or
otherwise restrained against his will pursuant to a governmental order or by the
affirmative exercise of state power." Id.; Taylor v. Garwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (E.D.
Pa. 2000). The court made the following observation regarding the "special relationship"
exception:
[Glovernment actors may be liable "when the State takes a person into
its custody and holds him there against his will." The creation of this
"special relationship" imposes upon the government a constitutional
54
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This Note focuses on the state-created danger exception to
DeShaney's general rule and not the special relationship exception.5 9
That is, if a state actor plays a role in the creation of a danger inflicted
upon a plaintiff, then the state actor may incur liability under § 1983. 60
The following subsections illustrate how the federal circuits have
struggled to define and add substance to the state-created danger
concept in various factual scenarios or have rejected the concept
altogether.
A.

Federal Circuits Which Have Recognized the State-CreatedDanger Theory
as a Viable Claim

Currently, all of the circuits, except the First and Fourth, have
recognized the legitimacy of the state-created danger concept. 61
However, each of the circuits applies a different test when confronted
with a state-created danger claim. 62 The following is a survey of the
more prominent cases addressing the theory within the circuits accepting
the state-created danger concept. The circuits are arranged in three
general categories based on the overall structure of their respective statecreated danger tests: (1) a test structure borrowed almost verbatim from
the DeShaney opinion; (2) cryptic, single-sentence tests which are illdefined in scope; and (3) elaborate and well-defined, enumerated tests.
The various intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts among the three test
structures are addressed in Part IV.B-C. 63
1.

The Eleventh Circuit: A Verbatim Adoption of DeShaney's Clouded
Dicta

The contours of the Eleventh Circuit's state-created danger test are
not clearly defined and seem to be the most ambiguous of all of the

"duty to assume some responsibility for [the] safety and general wellbeing" of the person whose liberty has been restrained.
Taylor, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (citations omitted).
58 See, e.g., Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997).
59 See supra note 6 for the specific language upon which the state-created danger concept
is based.
60 See supra note 6 for the specific language upon which the state-created danger concept
is based.
61 See generally infra Part III.B (discussing the First and Fourth Circuit's treatment of the
state-created danger concept).
62 See generally this part, Part III.A, for a survey of the circuits recognizing the
legitimacy of the state-created danger theory.
63 See generally infra Part IV.B-C (discussing the various intercircuit and intracircuit
conflicts).
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federal circuits that have adopted the theory as a viable constitutional
claim. 64 In fact, most of the Eleventh Circuit's test, as illustrated in Wyke
v. Polk County School Board65 and Powell v. Georgia Department of Human
Resources, 66 is taken almost verbatim from DeShaney's ambiguous
language. As such, the Eleventh Circuit will find liability under the
state-created danger theory when the "state affirmatively acts to restrain
an individual's freedom to act on his own behalf, either 'through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty."' 67 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit states that an affirmative
duty to protect an individual from the violence of a third party "arises
from the limitations the state places on an individual's ability to act on
his own behalf, not from the state's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him." 68

See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's
treatment of the state-created danger concept).
65 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir. 1997).
6
114 F.3d 1074, 1079 (11th Cir. 1997).
67 Wyke, 129 F.3d at 569 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
68 Id. at 570 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). In Wyke, a junior high school student
attempted to commit suicide on two different occasions during school hours. Id. at 563.
School officials were well aware of the suicide attempts but took no action to seek
counseling for the student before he ultimately killed himself. Id. The mother of the
student phoned the Dean regarding the suicide attempts, and the Dean said he "would
take care of it." Id. at 564. Following this phone conversation, the Dean summoned the
student to his office and read a Bible verse in an attempt to help the student. Id. The Dean
decided not to contact a licensed counselor since such a matter would involve too much
"red tape." Id. Subsequent to this meeting, the Vice Principal had been told by a custodian
that an unidentified male student had been "talking about killing himself." Id. However,
the Vice Principal did not pay any attention to the comment. Id. The following day, the
student committed suicide. Id. The court in Wyke initially recognized the legitimacy of the
state-created danger theory as a viable legal theory but held that the plaintiff failed to
satisfy its requirements. Id. at 570. The court reasoned that the school did not make the
student more vulnerable to harm by allegedly cutting off private sources of aid. Id. at 569.
Although the court noted that DeShaney "may have left the door open for [the] argument,"
the facts of this case did not create a situation where the school had an affirmative duty to
protect the student. Id. The court further reasoned that in order for the school to have
incurred a duty to protect the student, the Dean must have done more than tell the
student's parent that he would "take care of it." Id. at 570. Thus, the court maintained that
school officials could not have affirmatively prevented the student's mother from
protecting her son by mere words alone. Id. Flushed against this reasoning, the court in
Wyke did not find any state liability under the state-created danger theory. Id.
64
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2.

The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits:
Cryptic, Single-Sentence Tests Which Are Ill-Defined In Scope

a.

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit embraced the state-created danger theory as a
viable § 1983 claim in Dwares v. City of New York69 and found liability
"where [state officials] in some way [have] assisted in creating or
increasing the danger to the victim." 70 Following Dwares, the Second
Circuit attempted to establish contours around its state-created danger
analysis. 71 In Cook v. Groton,72 the court emphasized that there must be a
"causal relationship" between a state actor's alleged actions and the
creation of or increased danger. 73 In addition, the Second Circuit's
opinion in Robertson v. Arlington Central School District74 stated that a
state actor must specifically be placed on notice or warned of the alleged
danger under the state-created danger theory before liability can be
imposed. 75

985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 99. In Dwares, the plaintiff attended a flag-burning rally. Id. at 96. Although the
plaintiff did not physically participate in the flag desecration, he voiced his support for
those who did. Id. During the rally, a group of "skinheads," who were well-known to the
local police department, physically attacked and beat the plaintiff. Id. This brutal act
occurred in the presence of police officers who made no attempt to intervene. Id. The
plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the city and the individual officers who were
present. Id. at 97. The plaintiff argued that the defendants' inaction deprived him of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court held that the police officers
violated the plaintiff's due process rights by intentionally allowing the plaintiff to become
more vulnerable to assault in their presence by not interfering with the attack. Id. at 99.
The court stated that the "complaint in the present case was unlike that in DeShaney
because it went well beyond allegations that the defendant officers merely stood by and
did nothing, and that circumstances were merely suspicious." Id.; see also Cantwell, supra
note 31, at 337. Cantwell states that the court in Dwares observed that "the police's
behavior increased if not created the likelihood of Dwares being assaulted by the
skinheads." Cantwell, supra note 31, at 337.
7
Cook v. Groton, No. 97-73070, 1997 WL 722936, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997).
72
Id.
73 Id. The court maintained that "[t]he lack of any causal relationship between the
alleged acts of the officers and [plaintiff's] injuries is, therefore, fatal to her claim." Id.
74 No. 00-7170, 2000 WL 1370273 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2000).
75 Id. at *2. The court reasoned that "[a]bsent such notice, defendants [i.e., the state
actors] cannot be held liable under Dwares for having 'assisted in creating or increasing the
danger.'" Id.
69
70
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The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit states that liability under the state-created
danger theory exists when the state "creates, or substantially contributes
to the creation of a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a
danger [than] they would otherwise have been." 82 However, for many
years, the contours of this test have been subjected to considerable
litigation. 83 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the viability of the
present-day state-created danger theory and began to set its boundaries
nearly ten years before DeShaney in White v. Rochford.8 4 Following White,

82

Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2001); Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511,
518 (7th Cir. 1998); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993).
8
See infra notes 84-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
treatment of the state-created danger concept).
84 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). In Mhite, police officers arrested a driver for drag racing
on the Chicago Skyway. Id. at 382. The driver, who was the uncle of the three children
riding with him, pleaded with the police officers to transport the children to the police
station or to a phone booth in order to contact their parents. Id. However, the police
officers refused the uncle's requests. Id. The police officers left the children in the
abandoned car on the roadside in the frigid night. Id. Due to the cold night air, the
children left the vehicle and crossed eight lanes of traffic in search of a phone booth. Id.
Upon discovery of a phone booth, the children placed a call to their mother. Id. However,
their mother did not have access to a vehicle and requested police assistance. Id.
Consequently, the children were picked up by a neighbor. Id. The Seventh Circuit, then,
reversed the district court's granting of the defendants' motion to dismiss on what could
have been termed state-created danger grounds. Id. The court in White recognized the
state-created danger theory by stating:
[T]he issue before this court is whether the unjustified and arbitrary
refusal of police officers to lend aid to children endangered by the
performance of official duty violates the constitution where that
refusal ultimately results in physical and emotional injury to the
children. We hold that such conduct indisputably breaches the Due
Process Clause.
Id. at 383. The court further reasoned that the officers "could not avoid knowing that,
absent their assistance, the three children would be subjected to exposure to cold weather
and danger from traffic." Id. at 385. In addition, the court stated that such "indifference in
the face of known dangers certainly must constitute gross negligence." Id. Thus, the
plurality opinion in White found the officers liable under § 1983. Id. at 386. However, the
court refused to distinguish whether a state actor has to act "affirmatively" as opposed to
refusing to act in the face of such danger. Id. at 385. The court reasoned that making the
action-inaction distinction would amount to a "tenuous metaphysical construct which
differentiates sins of omission and commission." Id. at 384; see also Bowers v. DeVito, 686
F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). The court in Bowers recognized that the line between an
affirmative act and an omission is difficult to draw:
We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction,
between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is
clearer than it is. If the State puts a man in a position of danger from
private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say
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the Seventh Circuit continued to construct the parameters of its statecreated danger analysis in Archie v. City of Racine.85 In Archie, the
Seventh Circuit recognized that a government official could, if the
circumstances were right, be held responsible for creating a danger in a
noncustodial setting.8 6 Thus, the court in Archie stated that when a state
actor affirmatively places a person in danger, the state actor must protect
87
such a person "to the extent of ameliorating the incremental risk."
After DeShaney was handed down in 1989, the Seventh Circuit
continued to refine its state-created danger analysis. 88 In Losinski v.
County of Trempealeau, 89 the court emphasized the requirement of an
"affirmative act" by the state actor before liability can be imposed under
the theory. 90 Next, in Reed v. Gardner,91 the Seventh Circuit stated that

that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if
it had thrown him into a snakepit.
Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618; Cantwell, supra note 31, at 332 (recognizing that the "Seventh
Circuit, even prior to DeShaney, had rejected § 1983 suits in which the gravamen of the
complaint was government inaction"); Jeremy D. Kernodle, Note, Policing the Police:
Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the StateCreated Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 181-82 (2001) (arguing that White opted to
ignore the "action verses inaction distinction"). It should be noted that the term "statecreated danger" was not used by pre-DeShaney decisions. The pre-DeShaney decisions are
commonly referred to as "snake-pit cases," based on a famous quote from the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Bowers. "'If the State puts a man in a position of danger from private
people and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely
passive; it is as much a tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."' Pruessner,
supra note 35, at 359 (citing Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618). However, the concept behind the preDeShaney claims were basically the same as post-DeShaney claims despite the semantics of
the title adopted by the post-DeShaney decisions. Id. at 364.
85 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988).
86 Id. at 1222 ("The State may take custody of a person, or propel him into danger,
without formal imprisonment or civil commitment. We have suggested that if the
government hurls a person into a snake pit it may not disclaim responsibility for his
safety.").
87 Id. at 1223.
88 See generally Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1991).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 551. In Losinski, a deputy sheriff escorted a woman to her estranged husband's
residence in an attempt to retrieve certain items of personal property. Id. at 547. After
arriving at the residence, the woman and her estranged husband began to fight. Id.
Consequently, the estranged husband fatally shot the woman. Id. at 548. During the entire
episode, the deputy sheriff stood by and did not intervene. Id. The Seventh Circuit held
that the deputy sheriff did not create or enhance the danger to the woman. Id. at 550.
According to the court in Losinski, the woman had obtained the State's assistance in the face
of a known danger. Id. at 554. As such, the court reasoned that there was "no evidence
that the state acted to create the danger." Id. at 550. The court maintained that "[a]lthough
the state walked with [the woman] as she approached the 'lion's den,' it did not force her to
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liability under the theory could be imposed even if the plaintiff is not in
actual state custody. 92 However, the court in Reed initially stated that it
was hesitant to review the claim outside of the context of official state
custody.93
Nonetheless, the court stated that the case was
distinguishable from those cases in which state actors had no part in
creating a danger but did nothing when "suspicious circumstances
dictated a more active role for them." 94 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
in Reed concluded that liability under the theory can be found in
95
noncustodial contexts.
The court in Reed further maintained that DeShaney and its progeny
do not create an affirmative obligation for the police to protect citizens
from drunk drivers. 96 But the court stated that, although the police "did
not create the danger by buying [the intoxicated passenger] drinks and
providing him with a car, they did take action under color of state law
which rendered [the deceased victims] and the other motorists [on the
highway] vulnerable to a dangerous driver." 97 In addition, the Reed
court stated that liability can be found when a state actor's behavior
creates a danger for a specific plaintiff or the general public. 98

proceed," nor did the deputy sheriff do anything to amplify the danger when he arrived
with the woman at the residence. Id. Thus, the lack of an "affirmative" act by the deputy
sheriff precluded liability under the state-created danger theory. Id.; see also Wallace v.
Adkins, 115 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1997). The court in Wallace held that an order requiring
a prison guard to remain at an especially dangerous post, while at the same time offering
him false assurances that he would be protected, qualified as an affirmative act for
purposes of the state-created danger claim. Wallace, 115 F.3d at 430.
9'
986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993).
92 Id at 1126. In Reed, state police arrested the driver of a car but left the car and the keys
with an intoxicated passenger. Id. at 1123-24. The passenger drove the vehicle and
subsequently caused an accident killing two people. Id. at 1123. The decedents' estate
brought suit against various law enforcement bodies for constitutional violations based on
the state-created danger theory. Id. at 1124. The court in Reed held that plaintiffs could
assert their claim against the police officers. Id. at 1126.
93 Id. ("While we have been hesitant to find section 1983 liability outside the custodial
setting, we find that plaintiffs.. . may state claims for civil rights violations .. ")(citations
omitted).
94 Id. at 1125 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
203 (1989)).
95 Id. at 1127.
96 Id. The court stated that, "[tiaken to an extreme, police officers could watch drunk
drivers stumble to their cars and drive off, weaving across the road, without incurring
Section 1983 liability." Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. The court stated that "when the police create a specific danger, they need not
know who in particular will be hurt." Id.; see also Kemodle, supra note 84, at 179 (citing
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Significantly, the court emphasized that in some circumstances, a danger
can clearly be obvious. 99 Therefore, the lack of contact between a state
actor and a plaintiff will not be fatal to a state-created danger claim. 100
Finally, in Monfils v. Taylor,1°1 the Seventh Circuit held that a police
officer could be held liable under the state-created danger theory by
releasing a tape of an informant's anonymous call reporting a dangerous
crime. 0 2 The informant's voice was recognized by the perpetrators of
the crime, and the informant was murdered. 0 3 Under the state-created
danger theory, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury
to conclude that the police officer placed the informant in a position of
danger greater than he would have faced otherwise. °4 In addition, the
court further defined the parameters of the state-created danger theory
by commenting on whether a state actor must cut off all avenues of a
plaintiff's self-help before liability is found10l
The court emphasized
that "there is no absolute requirement that all avenues of self-help be
106
restricted."
d.

The Eighth Circuit

Like the Seventh Circuit, which recognized the essence of the present
state-created danger theory long before the Supreme Court's decision in
DeShaney, the Eighth Circuit also recognized the state-created danger

Reed v. Gardnerand stating that "when the government creates an egregious danger, it does
not need to know who in particular will be hurt").
99
Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127. The court noted that "[slome dangers are so evident, while
their victims are so random, that state actors can be held accountable by any injured party."
Id.
100 Id. at 1126-27. The court further reasoned that a state actor's "lack of direct contact
with the [plaintiff] does not necessarily preclude this action against them." Id.
101 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998).
102

103
104

Id. at 513.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 520.

Id. at 516. The court stated that "a State can be held to have violated due process by
placing a person in a position of heightened danger without cutting off other avenues of
aid." Id. at 517. But cf. Estate of Stevens v. City of Green Bay, 105 F.3d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that alternative avenues of aid must be cut off before liability will be imposed
under the state-created danger theory).
106
Monfls, 165 F.3d at 517; see also Kernodle, supra note 84, at 185 (recognizing that "the
Seventh Circuit held the City liable for releasing the identity of a police informant who was
later killed, even though the informant had other ways to protect himself against his
assailants").
105
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concept before DeShaney was decided. 07 Following the Supreme Court's
DeShaney decision, the Eighth Circuit began to construct a more
particularized state-created danger analysis in Freeman v. Ferguson.1° 8 In
Freeman, the Eighth Circuit set forth the following test: "The possibility
that a constitutional duty to protect an individual against private
violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken
affirmative action which increases the individual's danger of, or
vulnerability to, such violence beyond the level it would have been
absent state action." 109
After announcing the test in Freeman,the Eighth Circuit attempted to
further qualify its state-created danger analysis.10 In Carlton v. Cleburne
County,"' the Eighth Circuit recognized that the lack of actual "custody"
of a plaintiff was not fatal to a state-created danger claim.11 2 However,
the court in Carlton stressed that affirmative action on the part of the
state actor is required.1 13 Finally, the court stated that "mere knowledge
of danger to the individual does not create an affirmative duty to
n4
protect."

See Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 369 (8th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Circuit has been
very forthcoming in expressing its frustration with regards to defining a workable statecreated danger analysis. See, e.g., Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e
are not convinced that the law was so clearly established in 1991 that a reasonable official
under these factual circumstances would have known that his or her actions were violative
of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights."); Carlton v. Cleburne County, Arkansas, 93 F.3d 505,
508 (8th Cir. 1996) ("'[lIt is not clear, under DeShaney, how large a role the state must play
in the creation of danger and in the creation of vulnerability .... '") (citations omitted);
Davis v. Fulton County, Arkansas, 90 F.3d 1346, 1351 (8th Cir. 1996) ("There is no bright
line test for when state action can give rise to a particular duty to protect .. "); Freeman v.
Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The law is not entirely established as to the
extent to which the government must increase the danger of private violence before it
assumes a corresponding duty to protect.") (citations omitted). Thus, the Eighth Circuit is
representative of the confusion that the circuit courts have faced in their quest to interpret
the ambiguous principles that DeShaney set forth. Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody,
Creation of Danger, and Culpability,27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 478-79 (1994) (noting that "the
lower court opinions in this area reflect a sense of confusion and a need for guidlines and
principles beyond the foundation poured in DeShaney").
108 911 F.2d at 55.
109 Id.
110 See generally Carlton, 93 F.3d at 508-09.
ill Id. at 505.
107

112

Id. at 508.

Id. (recognizing that "affirmative conduct by government officials directly responsible
for placing particular individuals in a position of danger" is required under the statecreated danger theory).
113

114

Id.
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Next, in Davis v. Fulton County," 5 the Eighth Circuit stated that, in
order for a duty to protect to arise, plaintiffs must show that the danger
they face as a result of the state actor is greater than that faced by the
general public. 116 Finally, in S.S. v. McMullen,117 the Eighth Circuit stated
that a state-created danger claim must meet the "shocks the conscience"
standard.1 18 In addition, the court in McMullen seemed to have added an
additional element of intent to its analysis." 9 Specifically, the court
stated that whether a state actor has affirmatively placed someone in a
position of danger depends "on his or her state of mind." 120 However,
the court never explained the exact scope of this additional
2
consideration.' '
e.

The Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit recognized the state-created danger theory as a
viable constitutional claim in Wood v. Ostrander,122 approximately four
months after DeShaney was handed down. 23 After years of refinement,

90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1351. "[Tjhe actions of the state must create a unique risk of harm to the plaintiff
that is greater than the general public." Id.
117 225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000).
118 Id. at 964; see also Recent Case, ConstitutionalLaw-Substantive Due Process-EighthCircuit
Denies Liability for Returning Child in State Custody to Parent Despite Known Potential for
Abuse, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2001). Indeed, constitutional commentators have
noted that the "shocks the conscience" requirement is essential to a state-created danger
claim, as S.S. v. McMullen also recognized:
[E]ven if the defendants [i.e., the state actors] had affirmatively
endangered S.S., the alleged state action did not "shock the
conscience," as required to support the claim of a substantive due
process violation. Although the court agreed that the abuse itself
shocked the conscience, it held that the appropriate focus of the
inquiry is not on the abusive acts, but on the acts of the state, which
did not rise to the level of shocking.
Recent Case, supra (footnotes omitted).
119 McMullen, 225 F.3d at 962.
120
Id.; see also Recent Case, supra note 118, at 1659 (criticizing the court's opinion by
115
116

stating that "[tihe court unnecessarily stretched the holding of DeShaney and provided too
broad a shield to protect social workers from the consequences of their child-welfare
decisions").
121 McMullen, 225 F.3d at 961.
122 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
123 Id. at 595 (noting that DeShaney was decided on February 22, 1989, and Wood was
decided on June 27, 1989).
theory had been a viable
DeShaney was decided. Id.
was "clearly established by

The Ninth Circuit recognized that the state-created danger
claim as far back as 1984-approximately five years before
The court in Wood noted that the state-created danger theory
September 1984." Id. The court in Wood extracted support for
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the Ninth Circuit employs the following test to determine constitutional
liability under the state-created danger theory: "The plaintiff must
demonstrate, at the very least, that the State acted affirmatively ...and
with deliberate indifference ...in creating a foreseeable danger to the
plaintiff ...leading to the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights." 124
The Ninth Circuit applied the above test in Huffinan v. County of Los
Angeles. 125 In Huffinan, the plaintiffs' son was fatally shot by an off-duty
Both were highly
deputy sheriff during a bar room fight.126
127
The plaintiffs' son instigated a physical fight with the
intoxicated.
deputy sheriff outside the bar.128 In response to this attack, the deputy
sheriff fatally shot plaintiffs' son. 129 At no time did the deputy sheriff
130
ever reveal to the plaintiffs' son that he was a law enforcement officer.
The Huffinan court held that the sheriff's department did not violate
the plaintiffs' son's substantive due process rights.131 The court cited to
prior Ninth Circuit caselaw that placed emphasis on the "causal
relationship" that a plaintiff must establish between a state actor's

the state-created danger theory from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in White v. Rochford. Id.
at 592-93. Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wood, the Ninth Circuit set forth
various parameters around its state-created danger analysis in L.W. v. Grubbs. 92 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 1996). In Grubbs, the court attempted to define the level of culpability a state actor
must exhibit. Id. at 899-900. The court reasoned that "deliberate indifference" is the level
of culpability which a state actor must exhibit. Id. In addition to culpability, the Ninth
Circuit examined foreseeability in Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich. 92 F.3d 831, 836-37 (9th
Cir. 1996). The court in Van Ort held that "[p]ointing to a municipal policy action or
inaction as a 'but-for' cause is not enough to prove a causal connection .... Rather, the
policy must be the proximate cause of the section 1983 injury." Id. at 837 (citations
omitted). The court also noted that a state actor's "private acts" amount to "intervening"
and "unforeseeable" acts that will break the causal relationship. Id. at 837-42; see also Smith,
supra note 25, at 597. Smith recognizes that "[tihe first [Ninth Circuit opinion] to generally
apply the theory of state-created danger was Wood v. Ostrander." Smith, supra note 25, at
597.
124 Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
125
126

Id. at 1058-61.
Id. at 1056.

127

Id.

12S

Id.

129

Id.

130 Id. at 1056-57.

131 Id. at 1061. The court noted that the theory "does not create a broad rule that makes
state officials liable under the Fourteenth Amendment whenever they increase the risk of
some harm to members of the public." Id.
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conduct and the violation of a plaintiff's rights. 132 Based on Ninth
Circuit precedent, the court viewed the deputy sheriff's "private acts" as
an intervening force that severed the causal connection with the sheriff's
department. 133 Therefore, liability under the state-created danger theory
could not be obtained. 134
f.

The D.C. Circuit

The D.C. Circuit recently joined the majority of circuits recognizing
the state-created danger concept in Butera v. District of Columbia.135 In
acknowledging the validity of the state-created danger concept, the D.C.
Circuit set forth the following test to determine whether constitutional
liability should be imposed on a state actor: "An individual can assert a
substantive due process right to protection by the District of Columbia
from third-party violence when the District of Columbia officials
affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in
the individual's harm." 136 In addition, the D.C. Circuit requires that a
plaintiff "show that the [state actor's] conduct [is] so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.

" 137

132 Id. at 1059-60. The court reasoned that the sheriff's department "could not 'reasonably
have foreseen' [the deputy sheriff's] lethal 'private acts"' when it allegedly required him to
carry a gun off duty. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted). See generally L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d
894, 899-90 (9th Cir. 1996); Van Ort v. Estate of Stonewitch, 92 F.3d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir.
1996).
133 Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1059.
134 Id. at 1061. The court reasoned that "[wihether or not the County's failure specifically
to prohibit deputies from carrying guns while drinking was bad policy, it did not violate
[plaintiff's] rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the County could not have
foreseen [the state actor's] actions." Id.
135 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (joining the majority of federal circuits recognizing the
state-created danger theory on January 9, 2001).
136 Id.at 651.

137 Id. In Butera, the mother of a deceased, undercover police operative brought a civil
rights suit against the police department and four police officers. Id. at 640. The deceased
operative's estate alleged that various police officers had failed to protect him from harm
after leaving him alone during an undercover drug purchase. Id. at 642. The informant
had been beaten to death by three unidentified individuals. Id. at 643. The deceased's
estate based its suit on the state-created danger theory. Id. The court in Butera stated that it
had never before relied on DeShaney's language in recognizing the state-created danger
theory as other federal circuits have done. Id. at 644-45. Although the D.C. Circuit had
never been presented with a state-created danger claim before Butera, the D.C. Circuit had
addressed DeShaney's "special relationship" custody exception. Id. at 650. Significantly,
the court engaged in a comprehensive analysis of how the various federal circuits have
treated the state-created danger concept. Id. at 648-55. After this analysis, the court in
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The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits:
Enumerated Tests

a.

The Third Circuit

[Vol.37

Elaborate and Well-Defined,

The Third Circuit adopted the state-created danger theory of liability
in Kneipp v. Tedder.138 The Third Circuit created an elaborate four-part
test for analyzing claims under this theory: (1) whether the harm
ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) whether a state
actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3) whether
there existed some relationship between the state and plaintiff; and (4)
whether a state actor used his or her authority to create an opportunity
that otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to
occur.

13 9

Butera stated that most of the other circuits have held that the primary consideration in
determining liability under the theory was whether the state had engaged in affirmative
conduct that increased or created danger resulting in harm to the individual. Id. at 650. The
Butera court then announced that it would join the majority of the federal circuits
recognizing the state-created danger theory as a viable constitutional claim. Id. at 651.
Although the court recognized the theory as a viable claim, the court reasoned that the
claim was "not clearly established" at the time of the particular lawsuit at bar. Id. at 652.
The court stressed that the contours of the theory have been inconsistent among the various
circuits which have adopted it. Id. at 653. The court in Butera concluded that although all
of the various federal circuit tests have required affirmative conduct by a state actor, "the
circuits have adopted different nexus requirements" and have "employed differing degrees
of specificity in defining actionable conduct." Id. at 654. Against these principles, the court
held that the deceased's estate could not prevail on the state-created danger theory. Id.
The court stated, "[wie hold that law in this circuit was insufficiently clear in December
1997 to alert the District of Columbia and its police officers to possible constitutional
liability.., for their conduct." Id.
138 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
139 Id. at 1208. In Kneipp, a husband and wife were stopped and questioned by police
nearly one-third of a block from their home while walking back from a tavern. Id. at 1201.
The wife was visibly intoxicated and smelled of urine. Id. Police permitted the husband to
leave in order to check on the babysitter who was at their home. Id. at 1202. As the
husband left, the wife was leaning against the police car in an effort to maintain her
balance. Id. Later, during the trial, the husband testified that he believed that the police
would not leave his wife alone in such a condition. Id. However, the police left the wife at
the conclusion of their questioning. Id. As a result, the wife sustained hypothermia and
suffered permanent brain damage after she fell into an embankment and was exposed to
the frigid night air for several hours. Id. at 1203. The husband and wife brought a civil
rights suit under § 1983 against the city and the police officers who conducted the
questioning. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the police knew of the wife's intoxicated
condition and assumed responsibility to protect her when her husband left the scene. Id. at
1202. As such, the plaintiffs argued that the police increased the risk that the wife might be
injured when they abandoned her. Id. The court held that the "state-created danger"
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Following Kneipp, the Third Circuit applied its four-part test again in
Morse v. Lower Merion School District.140 However, in Morse, the Third
Circuit held that a daycare teacher who was killed while teaching failed
to meet the requirements of the state-created danger theory. 141 The court
reasoned that the state actors could not have foreseen that allowing
construction workers to use an unlocked back door at the daycare would
142
result in the "murderous act of a mentally unstable third party."
Essentially, the Third Circuit in Morse attempted to clarify its statecreated danger analysis as originally announced in Kneipp.143 The court
stated that "foreseeability" is the most important factor in Kneipp's fourpart test. 44 The court also qualified the third prong of its test by stating
that a state actor must have actual knowledge that a specific individual
Finally, the court
or class of individuals is faced with harm.145

theory was a viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional violation under § 1983. Id.
at 1211. After discussing the historical treatment of the state-created danger concept, the
Kneipp court applied its four-part test along with a "deliberate indifference" standard. Id.
at 1208. The court declined to distinguish terms such as "deliberate indifference," "reckless
indifference," "gross negligence," or "reckless disregard" in the context of a substantive
due process claim. Id. The court reasoned the wife's injuries were foreseeable due to her
visibly intoxicated state. Id. In addition, the court in Kneipp reasoned that the police acted
in willful disregard for the wife's safety since they knew she was intoxicated. Id. The court
further maintained that a relationship between the wife and the police existed since the
police exerted sufficient control over her by not allowing her to leave. Id. at 1209. Finally,
the court stated that the police made the wife more vulnerable to harm when they sent her
home unescorted. Id. Therefore, the court found that there was enough evidence to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether the police officers affirmatively placed the wife in danger.
Id. at 1211.
140 132 F.3d 902, 902-16 (3d Cir. 1997).
141 Id. at 916. The plaintiff's wife was shot by a mental patient while teaching at a stateowned daycare facility. Id. at 904. The school had a policy that all side and back doors
were to be locked at all times. Id. However, the mental patient entered the school through
an unlocked back entrance after a construction crew had propped the door open while
working on an outside swimming pool. Id.
142 Id. at 908.
143 See Madden, supra note 22, at 971 (comparing and contrasting the holdings in Kneipp
and Morse).
144 Morse, 132 F.3d at 912; see also Madden, supra note 22, at 966-67. Madden comments
on the court's treatment of foreseeability by noting that "the court [in Morse] seemingly
eliminates the need to characterize the state's conduct as an act as opposed to an omission.
The court noted that it is not clear whether the [state-created danger] theory mandates an
affirmative act and, if so, what constitutes an affirmative act." Id. Madden further notes
that "[tihe relationship requirement is not merely an extension of the direct causal
requirement, but instead ensures that the defendant had sufficient contact with the victim
so as to make the harm resulting from his or her actions foreseeable." Id. at 969.
145 Morse, 132 F.3d at 914. The court made the following observation:
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emphasized that whether a state actor's conduct in creating the peril can
be characterized as an "omission" or an "affirmative act" may not be
relevant. 146 The court continued to cast doubt on the requirement of an
"affirmative act" when it stated that "the dispositive factor appears to be
whether the state has in some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous
position that was foreseeable, and not whether the act was more
appropriately characterized as an affirmative act or omission." 147 In
other words, if state actors-through action or inaction-used their
authority in some manner to create a foreseeable opportunity for a third
148
party to inflict harm, then liability will follow.
b.

The Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit is the most recent of the federal circuits to recognize
the state-created danger theory as a viable legal claim. 149 Until recently,
the Fifth Circuit had a notorious reputation and history of avoiding the
issue by deciding such cases on other grounds.150 The Fifth Circuit
questioned whether the Supreme Court intended their comments in

The state-created danger theory of liability under § 1983 always
requires that a specific individual has been placed in harms way.
Although it is appropriate to draw lines here, there would appear to be
no principled distinction between a discrete plaintiff and a discrete
class of plaintiffs. The ultimate test is one of foreseeability.
Id.
146 Id. The court in Morse stated that whether affirmative acts are required under the
state-created danger theory is "less than clear" and that the "line between an affirmative act
and an omission is difficult to draw." Id.
147 Id. at 915; see also Madden, supra note 22, at 970 (discussing the court's treatment of the
action-inaction distinction).
148 Morse, 132 F.3d at 915. The court reasoned that whether state actors "used their
authority to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third
party's crime to occur" should be the focus rather than inquiring into the action-inaction
distinction. Id.; see also Madden, supra note 22, at 970. Madden emphasizes that "[t]he
court in Morse expounded on this element of the test by noting that the state action does not
necessarily have to be an 'act,' but instead may be characterized as an 'omission.' The
important factor is whether the state created the opportunity for a foreseeable harm to
occur." Madden, supranote 22, at 970.
149 McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit
officially recognized the state-created danger theory on July 26, 2001. Id. The court
announced, "[wie have not heretofore explicitly adopted and enforced this theory. We do
so now." Id. at 436.
150 See generally Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 1997); Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995); LeFall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.
1994); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Pruessner, supra note 35, at
371 (discussing Fifth Circuit cases that refused to recognize the state-created danger theory
as settled law).
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DeShaney to carve out an area of liability under § 1983.151 The Fifth
Circuit interpreted the language in DeShaney as nothing more than a
contextual observation by the Supreme Court. 152 In McClendon v. City of
Columbia,5 3 the Fifth Circuit set forth the following test: (1) whether a
state actor increased the danger to a plaintiff and (2) whether a state
actor acted with deliberate indifference. 154
In addition, the court in McClendon hinted that courts should also
consider the following factors: (1) whether a state actor acted with
"affirmative conduct" and had "knowledge" of the peril and (2) whether
a "causal connection" existed between a state actor's behavior and a
victim's ultimate injury.155 However, the court did not expressly state
that these factors must always be satisfied when engaging in the state56
created danger analysis

151 See LeFall, 28 F.3d at 530-31.
152 Id.; see also Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997). The
court in Doe recognized that the Fifth Circuit "[has] never sustained liability on statecreated danger grounds." Doe, 113 F.3d at 1415.
153 McClendon, 258 F.3d at 432.
154 Id. at 435. A plaintiff must establish that the state actor acted with deliberate
indifference by the following standard:
"[T]he environment created by the state actors must be dangerous;
they must know it is dangerous; and, to be liable, they must have used
their authority to create an opportunity that would not otherwise have
existed for the third party's crime to occur. Put otherwise, the
defendants must have been at least deliberately indifferent to the
plight of the plaintiff."
Id. at 436 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In McClendon, the plaintiff was shot by
a police informant during an argument. Id. at 434. The gun utilized in the shooting had
been loaned to the informant by the police for the informant's own personal protection. Id.
At the time of the loan, the police were aware of the possibility of violence erupting
between the plaintiff and the informant. Id. As such, the plaintiff argued that he was
deprived of his substantive due process rights since the police "knowingly and
affirmatively created a dangerous situation by providing [the informant] with a gun when
[the police were] aware that violence was likely to erupt between them." Id. at 435. The
court in McClendon initially announced its recognition and approval of the state-created
danger theory as a viable claim. Id. at 436. The court held that a reasonable trier of fact
could find that the police had created a danger that the informant would shoot the plaintiff
and, therefore, contributed to such an opportunity. Id. at 438. After applying the statecreated danger analysis, the court emphasized that the most important consideration that
courts must examine is whether the state actually created the danger or at least made the
victim more vulnerable to it in some manner. Id. at 437.
155 Id. at 437-38.
156 Id.
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The Tenth Circuit

The Tenth Circuit's state-created danger analysis is the most
elaborate of all of the federal circuits that have adopted the theory. In
Uhlrig v. Harder,157 the Tenth Circuit set forth five elements to be met
before a plaintiff can prevail under the state-created danger theory:
(1) whether the plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group; (2) whether the state actor's conduct put the plaintiff at
substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (3) whether
the risk was obvious or known; (4) whether the state actor acted
recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and (5) whether such
conduct, when viewed in total, shocks the conscious. 58 Moreover, in
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools, 1 59 the Tenth Circuit added a sixth
element to the Uhlrig's five-part analysis: A plaintiff must show "that
the charged individual defendant actors created the danger or increased
the plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger in some way."160
In Armijo, the Tenth Circuit applied its elaborate six-part test in a
case involving a suspended, suicidal special-education student. 161 As an
initial matter, the court recognized that the state-created danger concept
162
was clearly established law well before the student committed suicide.
Significantly, the court in Armijo stated that the key to state-created
danger claims is the degree of the state actor's "culpable knowledge"
and "conduct in affirmatively placing an individual in a position of
danger."163

157 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995).
158 Id. at 574.

159 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
160
Id. at 1263; see also Eckert v. Town of Silverthorne, No. 00-1030, 2001 WL 856426, at *7
(10th Cir. July 9, 2001); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 918 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the
six-part test under Uhlrig and Armijo).
161 Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1256. Before the student was suspended, school officials were well
aware of his ongoing low self-esteem and suicidal tendencies. Id. On the day of the
suicide, a school official violated school policy by dropping the special-education student
off at his home without first checking to see whether his parents were there. Id. at 1257.
The student then gained access to a rifle and fatally shot himself in the chest. Id. The
parents of the student brought suit against the school for violating their son's civil rights
under § 1983 and the state-created danger theory. Id.
162 Id. at 1262.
163 Id. at 1263. The court stated that "the environment created by the state actors must be
dangerous; and, to be liable, they must have used an opportunity that would not otherwise
have existed for the third party's [acts] to occur." Id. Applying the state-created danger
theory, the court held that (1) the student was "a member of a limited and specifically
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Federal Circuits That Have Not Recognized the State-Created Danger
Theory as a Viable Claim

The First and Fourth Circuits have not recognized the state-created
danger theory as a legitimate legal claim. 164 The sweeping consequences
of this nonrecognition are illustrated below.
1.

The First Circuit: Slouching Towards Rejection With Some Hesitation

The First Circuit has not officially accepted the state-created danger
theory as a viable constitutional claim. 165 With great frustration, the First
Circuit seemingly rejected the theory in Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling
Center, Inc.166 but later questioned whether it had made the correct choice
167
in subsequent judicial decisions.
In Monahan, the court felt that state-created danger claims were
really state tort claims in disguise. 168 The court recognized that, even if a
plaintiff is rendered more vulnerable to danger as in DeShaney, "this is
not the kind of 'affirmative act' on part of the state which would give rise
to a constitutionalrather than a tort duty to protect [the plaintiff]." 169 The
court in Monahan stated that, even if a state actor's actions of failing to
protect a person were "negligent or even willfully indifferent or
reckless," such actions cannot "take on the added character of violations
of the Federal Constitution." 70 The court stated that the state-created
danger theory would, in effect, "convert most torts by state actors into

definable group"-namely, students who have expressed threats of suicide; (2) the school
officials' conduct placed the student at "substantial risk of serious, immediate and
proximate harm by suspending him from school, which caused him to become distraught
and to threaten violence" and by leaving him home alone; (3) the school officials knew of
the student's suicidal tendencies and of his access to the firearm; (4) the school officials
acted "recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk for suicide" when they took this action;
(5) the sum total of the school officials' conduct was "conscious-shocking;" and (6) all of
these facts as a whole strongly "increased the risk" to the special education student. Id. at
1264. Thus, the school could not escape liability under the state-created danger theory. Id.
164 See infra generally this Part, Part III.B (discussing the First and Fourth Circuits'
treatment of the state-created danger concept).
165 See infra notes 166-181 and accompanying text (discussing the First Circuit's treatment
of the state-created danger concept).
166 961 F.2d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 1992). The court stated that "Monahan's remedies, like
those of most others in similar situations, lie in the arena of tort, not constitutional law." Id.
167 See Pruessner, supra note 35, at 367-69 (discussing the First Circuit's treatment of the
state-created danger theory).
16' Monahan, 961 F.2d at 991.
169 Id. at 993.
170 Id.
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constitutional violations. " 171 According to the court, DeShaney clearly
prohibited such a claim under § 1983 jurisprudence. 7 2
Following Monahan, the First Circuit continued to struggle with the
question of whether it should adopt the state-created danger theory, and
in Soto v. Flores,173 it reflected upon its decision in Monahan 7 4 The court
stated that "where the ultimate harm is caused by a third party, courts
must be careful to distinguish between conventional torts and
constitutional violations, as well as between state inaction and action." 175
Thus, the court concluded that "the state-created danger theory is a
difficult question" and avoided the issue completely by resolving the
176
case on other grounds.
Likewise, in Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia,177 the First Circuit once again
ducked the state-created danger issue.178 The court in Garcia continued
to struggle with the ambiguities of the theory. 7 9 A concurring opinion
in Garcia stated that it would be unfortunate if "instead of relying on
state legislatures and courts to provide legal means to redress matters of
this nature, federal courts transform conduct that is at most tortious into
constitutional causes of action." 180 Thus, the First Circuit has not

Id. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's remedies "lie in the arena of tort, not
constitutional law." Id. at 991; see also Faberman, supra note 33, at 138 ("Not every tort
committed by a state actor can be remedied by the Constitution.").
172 Monahan, 961 F.2d at 993 (noting that DeShaney clearly contemplated "something more
when it referred to 'render[ing a party] more vulnerable to [a danger']").
173 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).
174 Id. at 1062-64.
175
Id. at 1064. See also BODENsTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 396-97. Professors
Bodensteiner and Levinson argue that "[tihere remains, however, much disagreement in
the lower courts as to when government abuse of power is sufficiently egregious to state a
substantive due process violation, rather than merely an ordinary common-law tort." Id.
176 Soto, 103 F.3d at 1064 (reasoning that because "we find that this claim may be resolved
on immunity grounds, we choose not to reach this question").
177 115 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1997).
178
Id.
179 Id. at 51. The court vented its frustration with the state-created danger theory by
stating,
We therefore do not reach the nettlesome legal question of whether, in
light of DeShaney ... a police officer's knowing refusal to carry out the
express terms of a non-discretionary detention order can be deemed
.an affirmative act," that, by increasing the risk of private harm to
those sought to be protected by the order, may trigger due process
concerns.
Id.
180 Id. at 57 (Campbell, J.,
concurring).
171
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endorsed the state-created danger theory as a viable constitutional
claim. 181
2.

The Fourth Circuit: Absolute Rejection

Unlike the First Circuit, which seemed to question whether it should
recognize the state-created danger theory as a viable claim before sidestepping the issue, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the theory in
Pinder v. Johnson.182 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's position, as adopted in
183
Pinder,has been viewed as a controversial matter.
In Pinder, the plaintiff contacted the police after a former boyfriend
broke into her home and threatened her and her children.'84 In response,
a police officer arrived and arrested the ex-boyfriend. 185 The plaintiff
feared for her life and for the lives of her children and asked the officer
whether she could safely leave her home for work in the upcoming
hours. 86 The police officer told the plaintiff that her ex-boyfriend would
be locked in jail overnight.187 Based on this assurance, the plaintiff left
her children alone and went to work. 188 Nonetheless, the plaintiff's exboyfriend was immediately released on his own recognizance and was
ordered to stay away from the plaintiff and her children. 189 The ex-

181 See supra this Part, Part III.B.1 (discussing the First Circuit's treatment of the state-

created danger theory).
182 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Kernodle, supra note 84, at 172 (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's treatment of the state-created danger theory).
183 See Pruessner, supra note 35, at 369 (observing the controversial nature of Pinder v.
Johnson); Recent Case, ConstitutionalLaw-Substantive Due Process-FourthCircuit Holds Police
Officer Not Liablefor Exposing Children to Harm That Culminated In Their Murder, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 524, 526-29 (1995). The following criticism of Pinder v. Johnson has been noted:
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Pinder is a product of both a
misunderstanding of the plaintiff's case and an insufficiently nuanced
reading of DeShaney and its progeny. A more exacting analysis would
have concluded that Pinder's due process claims do fit into a well
established body of law .... Thus, although the court was arguably
justified in holding that qualified immunity shielded [Officer] Johnson
from liability, it should not have rejected the substance of Pinder's
claims in as sweeping manner as it did.
Id. at 526-27.
18
185
186
187
188
189

54 F.3d at 1172.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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boyfriend returned to the plaintiff's home and set it on fire.190 Tragically,
the plaintiff's children were burned alive as they slept in their beds. 191
The Fourth Circuit in Pinderheld that DeShaney did not create a duty
192
for state actors to protect individuals from the harm of third parties.
The court vehemently stated that "[i]t cannot be that the state 'commits
an affirmative act' or 'creates a danger' every time it does anything that
makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely." 193 For example,
the court reasoned that a state could become liable for "every crime
committed by ... prisoners [who are] released" into society. 94
Therefore, the court in Pinder warned district courts to resist the
95
temptation to artfully recharacterize inaction as action.
Moreover, the court in Pinder explicitly maintained that DeShaney
did not create a duty to protect outside of the custodial context. 196 The

190

Id.

191 Id. Following these tragic events, the plaintiff brought suit against the police officer
and police department under § 1983 and the state-created danger theory. Id. The plaintiff
argued that the police officer deprived her and her children of their constitutional rights
when the police officer allegedly failed to take affirmative action to protect them from her
violent ex-boyfriend. Id. The defendants moved for summary judgment, but the district
court denied the motion. Id.
192 Id. at 1176. The court stated,
Given the principles laid down by DeShaney, it can hardly be said that
[the state actor] was faced with a clearly established duty to protect
Pinder or her children ....
Indeed, it can be argued that DeShaney
established exactly the opposite, i.e., that no such affirmative duty
existed because neither Pinder nor her children were confined by the
state.
Id. But see Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights In ConstitutionalLaw: No Need to Graft, Best
Not Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 773 (2001). MacNaughton emphasizes that "the Fourth
Circuit [in Pinder] seems to have chosen a mechanical application of DeShaney's broad
negative rights rule rather than to have sought to do justice to Pinder. This decision
poignantly illustrates the injustice worked by the sweeping negative rights rule of
DeShaney." Id.; Pruessner, supra note 35, at 370 ("The majority in Pinder was quickly
criticized and questioned. The opinion seems to mischaracterize the case as a simple
failure to protect due to a failure to jail the suspect. That mischaracterization forced the
case into the DeShaney mold.").
193 Pinder,54 F.3d at 1175.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1176.

19 Id. The court reasoned that the "lack of any clearly established duty to protect
individuals outside of the custodial context is also reflected in the law in the lower federal
courts at the time of the events in question." Id. The court noted,
There was no custodial relationship with the plaintiffs in this case.
Neither Johnson nor any other state official had restrained Pinder's
freedom to act on her own behalf. Pinder was never incarcerated,
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court stated that mere awareness by a state actor, outside that of the
197
penal/institutional context, cannot amount to constitutional liability.
The court noted that the federal circuit courts that have established an
affirmative duty to protect involved situations where the state action
"took a much larger and more direct role in 'creating' the danger
itself." 198 Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not
impose constitutional liability upon the police officer for his assurances
of safety. 199 Holding otherwise, the court maintained, would be the "first
step down the slippery slope of liability" since such a right could be
200
triggered every time an individual is harmed by a third party.
Nonetheless, four judges issued a stinging dissent. 201 The dissenting
judges initially noted that, in DeShaney, the Supreme Court did not reject
the state's clearly established duty to protect an individual from the
harm of third parties. 20 2 The dissent stated that caselaw from other
circuits clearly established the police officer's affirmative duty to protect
the plaintiff and her children. 203 Against this backdrop, the dissent
reasoned that the police officer knew the danger that the ex-boyfriend
posed to the plaintiff and her children.2°4 The dissent further reasoned
that the police officer falsely represented that the ex-boyfriend would not

arrested, or otherwise restricted in any way. Without any such
limitation imposed on her liberty, DeShaney indicates Pinder was due
no affirmative constitutional duty of protection from the state ....
Id. at 1175.
197

Id. at 1176-77.

Id. at 1176. The court stated that "a promise of aid does not actually place a person in
a dangerous position and then cut off all outside sources of assistance. Promises from state
officials can be ignored if the situation seems dire enough." Id. at 1175. However, the court
noted that, "[alt some point on the spectrum between action and inaction, the state's
conduct may implicate it in the harm caused, but no such point is reached here." Id.
199 Id. at 1179; see also Stevenson v. Martin County Bd. of Educ., No. 99-2685, 2001 WL
98358, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001) (citing Pinder v. Johnson and noting that "the failure to
protect by itself is not sufficient to trigger constitutional liability").
200 Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1178. After reviewing various sister-circuit courts, the court noted
that the state-created danger theory was not a "clearly established" constitutional right. Id.
at 1177-78.
201 Id. at 1179-82 (Russell, J., dissenting).
202
Id. at 1180 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989)).
203
Id. at 1181; see Blum, supra note 107, at 468. Blum criticizes Pinder v. Johnson's
justifications for denying liability by noting that the Court had, in effect, "outlined the
safeguards that were already in place to restrict the scope of liability for any breach of a
substantive due process duty to provide protection in a non-custodial context." Blum,
supra note 107, at 468.
2o4 Pinder,54 F.3d at 1180-81.
19
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be released from jail. 205 As a result, the police officer induced the
20 6
plaintiff to return to work through a "false sense of security."
Therefore, the police officer had a duty to protect the plaintiff and her
children since his actions created significant-but false-assurances of
safety.20 7 The Pinder dissent stands for the proposition that the police
officer at least had a "duty to phone the [plaintiff] and warn her that [her
ex-boyfriend] had been released from police custody." 2 8 Therefore, the
20 9
police officer failed to properly protect the plaintiff.
IV. THE ERRATIC GROWTH OF THE VARIOUS STATE-CREATED DANGER
TESTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INCONSISTENT BREEDS

It is evident, on a most superficial view, that a vast amount of
judicial inconsistency exists among the federal circuits with regard to the
state-created danger theory. 210 Specifically, the conflicts surrounding the
state-created danger concept exist on three distinct and prominent
levels. 211 First, a split exists between the circuits recognizing the statecreated danger theory as a viable claim and the circuits refusing to accept
the state-created danger theory. 212 Second, contrary conclusions about
the scope and application of the state-created danger concept exist
among the circuits that recognize the theory.213 Finally, intracircuit
conflicts exist among several of the circuits recognizing the state-created
danger theory.214 Thus, given the wide gulf of disparity among the

205

206
207

208
209

Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1181-82.

Id.
210 See, e.g., Christopher Barr, Constitutional Law-The Duty of Public Schools to Protect
Students From Other Students Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1045 (1993), 66
TEMP. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1993) (recognizing that the "lower courts have differed in their
interpretations of DeShaney").
211 See infra this Part, Part IV (analyzing the various intercircuit and intracircuit
inconsistencies).
212 Compare discussion supraPart III.A with Part III.B.
213 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the different state-created danger tests among the
circuits recognizing the theory as a viable claim).
214 See supraPart III.A.2.a, c (discussing the Second and Seventh Circuit's treatment of the
state-created danger theory).
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circuits, confusion and unequal treatment of litigants living in different
215
judicial districts inevitably occurs.
A.

The Intercircuit Conflict Between the Circuits Recognizing the StateCreated Danger Theory as a Viable Legal Claim and the Circuits Refusing
to Accept the Theory

The first level of judicial inconsistency surrounding the treatment of
the state-created danger theory is, of course, the bright-line split between
the circuits recognizing the theory as a viable legal claim and the circuits
disfavoring it.216 Presently, ten circuits recognize the legitimacy of the
state-created danger theory while two circuits refuse to recognize the
concept. 217 Given the wide amount of recognition the theory has
received from the majority of the circuits accepting it, the underlying
rationales of the two circuits rejecting the theory must be explored.
The views expressed by the First and Fourth Circuits explain that the
state-created danger theory will not be recognized in their respective
jurisdictions. 218 The First Circuit clearly states its conclusion that the
state-created danger concept would "convert most torts by state actors
into constitutional violations." 219 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has
focused on the possible ramifications of a state actor's "affirmative
acts." 220 Extended to its logical conclusion, the Fourth Circuit maintains
that the state-created danger theory would create a slippery slope of
liability since a state could incur liability every time a prisoner is
released into society. 221 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has stated that
222
DeShaney precludes liability outside that of actual state custody.
Nonetheless, the views advanced by the First and Fourth Circuits are
fundamentally flawed.

215 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Casefor Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85
VA. L.REV. 1243, 1249 (1999) (commenting on the harmful effects of circuit splits).
216 See supra Part III.A-B (discussing the various positions the circuits have taken
regarding the state-created danger theory).
217 See supra Part III.A-B (discussing the various positions the circuits have taken
regarding the state-created danger theory).
218 See supra Part llI.B (discussing the First and Fourth Circuits' views of the state-created
danger concept).
219 Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1992).
220 Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995).
221 Id.
M" Id. at 1176.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/3

D.: Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Cons

212
1.

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

The First Circuit's Flawed Reasoning

The First Circuit's refusal to recognize the state-created danger
theory is misplaced. 223 In evaluating the destructive force and effect of
the First Circuit's views, one must recognize § 1983's legislative history,
recent circuit caselaw, and the DeShaney opinion.224 First, it is apparent
that § 1983 was not enacted to make a broad transformation of every
state tort into various constitutional torts. 225 Instead, § 1983 was enacted
for a specific and limited purpose: to interpose federal protection against
the deliberate inaction by state and local officials in the face of Ku Klux
Klan terrorism.226
Section 1983's protections should be equally
applicable to the evils committed by present-day state and local officials
as well.
Although the First Circuit is correct in stating that "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...does not transform every tort
committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation," § 1983 was
specifically enacted to impose liability on a state actor who deliberately
refused to act in the presence of a known danger. 227 Therefore, § 1983
was enacted with a specific purpose in mind and will not, by definition,
if properly applied, transform every tort claim into a constitutional
violation.
Furthermore, the exclusionary breadth of the First Circuit's analysis
is greatly undercut in light of the heightened culpability requirement
built into all constitutional torts under substantive due process. 228 That

Recent Case, supra note 183, at 527 (stating that the "Fourth Circuit confined the Due
Process Clause to a restrictive interpretation that the language of DeShaney does not
support").
224 See generally supra Parts I.A, III.
M2 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (analyzing the history of § 1983).
226 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (analyzing the history of § 1983).
227 Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 1997) (Campell, J.,
concurring)
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)).
22
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (discussing the "deliberate
indifference" standard); Karen M. Blum, Affirmative Duties of Government After DeShaney, in
223

SWORD & SHIELD REVISITED:

A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 203-04 (Mary

Massaron Ross ed., 1998). According to Blum:
The Supreme Court has not definitely established the level of
culpability that is required to make out a substantive due process
claim based on a failure to protect, but has held that something more
than "mere negligence" must be shown .... Multiple standards,
including gross negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference,
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is, a state actor's culpability must "shock the conscience" of the court.229
Since all of the circuits recognizing the state-created danger theory
employ the "shocks the conscience" standard, or a similar requirement,
ordinary state torts and constitutional torts can be distinguished.2 30
Inevitably, this heightened culpability requirement will filter out
frivolous state-created danger claims brought by unscrupulous plaintiffs.
Finally, although the DeShaney opinion itself expressed concerns
about turning every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional
violation, DeShaney makes clear that liability can be imposed in certain
limited situations. 231 Although federalism concerns regarding state
autonomy over tort policy are present, the sanctity of state tort law
should not trump the remedial purpose of § 1983 when an individual's
constitutional rights become an issue. Consideration of this fact compels
the conclusion that the First Circuit's restrictive reading of DeShaney is
incorrect.
2.

The Fourth Circuit's Flawed Reasoning

Equally without merit is the Fourth Circuit's related argument that
every act by a state actor, if extended to its logical conclusion, would
create constitutional liability under the state-created danger theory. 232
The exclusionary breadth of this sweeping rationale is an effort to
completely disregard the legislative history of § 1983 and DeShaney

intent, and conscience-shocking conduct, have been articulated by the
lower courts.
Blum, supra.
2
See Shapo, supra note 35, at 13. Shapo makes the following observation:
Harking to [Section 1983's] legislative history, this standard would call
for a brutality or arbitrariness which goes beyond the garden variety
state tort action. In many of the post-Monroe decisions under Section
1983, this standard finds support in declaration that actionable conduct
should be "reprehensible," or "callous and shocking," that "trivial
violations" will not suffice, and even in some cases "bad motive may
•.. become critical."
Id.
23
See Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of
Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201 (1984), in A SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY
125, 134 (Sheldon H. Nahmod ed., 1993) ("Courts state that constitutional tort should be
available not for every injury cognizable at common law, but only when there is an 'abuse'
or 'misuse' of power, or when the governmental defendant's conduct was 'severe,'
'reprehensible,' or 'egregious.'").
231
DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189.
232 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the state-created
danger theory).
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altogether. 233
Again, nothing in §1983's legislative history nor
DeShaney's plain language leads to such a restrictive conclusion.234 The
main objective of § 1983 is not to merely impose liability upon state
actors but rather to afford individuals more protection in the face of
foreseeable dangers. Thus, the essential premises underlying the Fourth
Circuit's approach are at odds with § 1983's legislative history and the
235
DeShaney opinion.
Concomitantly inconsistent with DeShaney is the Fourth Circuit's
assertion that a state actor's duty to provide protection exists only in
actual custody. 236 Although actual control in custodial situations may be
a relevant factor, some limitation on a person's ability to act, or a state
actor's promises to act, should be the prerequisite for finding a custodial
relationship. The Court in DeShaney never fashioned such a clear-cut,
restrictive position concerning actual custody. 237 Rather, the Court in
DeShaney articulated that some form of "limitation" be imposed on an
individual by the state actor. 238 Accordingly, like the First Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning as to why the state-created danger theory
should not be recognized is fundamentally flawed.
B.

The Intercircuit Conflicts Among the Ten Circuits Accepting the StateCreatedDanger Theory as a Viable Legal Claim

The second level of judicial inconsistency surrounding the statecreated danger concept involves the different tests adopted by the ten

233 See generally supra Part II (discussing § 1983's legislative history and DeShaney).
2M See Pruessner, supra note 35, at 378. Pruessner recognizes that in light of "the
statutory language and legislative history of § 1983" the Fourth Circuit in Pinder v. Johnson
was mistaken in its approach and that such a result "would contradict the clear legislative
history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871." Id.
235 See supra Part 111.B.2 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the state-created
danger theory).
2M See Recent Case, supra note 183, at 528-29. The following criticism of Pinder has been
noted:
[A]lthough the majority [in Pinderv. Johnson] emphasized that Pinder's
children were not in State custody, DeShaney is not so narrow as to
establish custody as the sine qua non of liability ....
[T]he Fourth
Circuit in Pinder should have held [the state actor] accountable for the
fatal consequences of making a promise that he could not or would not
keep,
Id.
237 See infra Part IV.B.2.c (analyzing the custody issue).
2 8 See infra Part IV.B.2.c (analyzing the custody issue).
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circuits recognizing the theory's legitimacy. 239 The only consistency
among the ten circuits is that each of them mechanically cite to
DeShaney's canonical dicta. 240
To illustrate, the most visible
inconsistencies include: (1) whether the state-created danger concept is
"clearly established" law; (2) the scope of the actual elements within each
circuit's respective tests; (3) the special emphasis placed on different
elements within each respective test; and (4) the infamous action-inaction
241
distinction.
1.

The "Clearly Established" and "Not Clearly Established" Distinction

Although ten federal circuits have relied on DeShaney's language in
recognizing the state-created danger concept, not all of these circuits
have recognized the theory as "clearly established" law at the time of
deciding their respective judicial opinions. 242 Significantly, one of the ten
circuits denied liability under the state-created danger theory on the
basis that the law in this area was unsettled at the time-even though a
vast majority of the other circuits recognized the state-created danger
243
theory as established law.
The Eighth and D.C. Circuits have expressly stated that the statecreated danger theory is not "clearly established" law. 244 Although the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged the theory's existence, it precluded liability
based on the lack of any "clearly established" law. 245 The Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits have avoided the position of stating that the
theory is not "clearly established;" rather, these circuits merely note that

239 See supra Part III.A (surveying the ten circuits accepting the state-created danger
concept).
240
See generally supra Part 11.
241 See generally supra Parts III, W.
242
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). It is worthy of note here to
understand what constitutes a "clearly established" constitutional right. The contours of
the constitutional right at issue must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A state actor may be able to raise the defense of qualified immunity if
such a constitutional claim is "unclear." Id.
243 See supra Part III.A.2.f (discussing the D.C. Circuit's reasoning regarding the "clearly
established" status of the state-created danger theory).
244 Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[Cionstitutional
right to protection by the District of Columbia from third-party violence was not clearly
established."); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[Tihe law is not
entirely established as to the extent to which the government must increase the danger of
private violence before it assumes a corresponding duty to protect.").
245 Butera, 235 F.3d at 654.
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some of the theory's contours remain to be defined. 246 Finally, the
Second Circuit hinted that a claim under the state-created danger
concept may be brought, but it avoided the "clearly established" issue
247
without supplying any further commentary.
In sharp contrast, the Fifth and Third Circuits have stated that the
state-created danger theory is constitutionally sound. 248 Significantly,
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have explicitly stated that the theory is
"clearly established" law. 249 The Ninth and Tenth Circuit's conclusions
seem to have been compelled by two separate considerations: the
holdings of the pre-DeShaney cases and the extensive line of postDeShaney caselaw that found liability under the theory. 250
All ten circuits have embraced the state-created danger theory but
maintain strikingly different viewpoints as to whether the theory has
been "clearly established." 25' The views advanced by nearly all ten of
these circuits offer convincing explanations for their respective positions

246 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998) ("In DeShaney, the
Court left open the possibility that the state may be liable for private acts which violate
constitutionally protected rights."); Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 567 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("The language of DeShaney does indeed 'leave room' for state liability where the
state creates a danger or renders an individual more vulnerable to it. Exactly what type of
state action fits within that exception has been the subject of considerable debate since
DeShaney.") (citations omitted); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating
that "DeShaney ...leaves the door open for liability in situations where the state creates a
dangerous situation or renders citizens more vulnerable to danger.").
247 Cook v. Groton, No. 97-7307, 1997 WL 722936 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 1997) ("Because of our
disposition of this matter, we need not address whether the state-created danger theory
was 'clearly established' in May 1991.").
248 McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have
continued to recognize the existence of the theory and observed that other circuits have
found this theory to be constitutionally sound."); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d
Cir. 1996) (recognizing the establishment of the state-created danger theory by extracting
"additional support.., in the [other] courts of appeals' decisions previously cited").
249 Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e agree
with the district court that the law was clearly established."); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d
583, 593 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "'an additional factor that may be considered in
ascertaining whether the law is 'clearly established' is a determination of the likelihood that
the Supreme Court or this circuit would have reached the same result"' as other circuits
and concluding that the law had been established by the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
KWhite).
250 See discussion supra Part III.A; see also Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.
1985). The court held that "in the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to
whatever decisional law is available to ascertain whether the law is clearly established." Id.
251 See generally supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the treatment of the "clearly established"
concept among the circuits).
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on the issue.252 Notwithstanding the First and Fourth Circuits, none of
the circuits have explicitly rejected the state-created danger theory as a
25 3
legitimate theory on which to base a § 1983 claim.
Nonetheless, it is significant that no case before DeShaney contained
25 4
the precise holding that due process mandates a duty of protection.
This would seem to imply that the state-created danger theory was not
clearly established law prior to DeShaney and immediately afterwards.
Yet, if such a level of specificity would be required to clearly establish
the state-created danger theory as a legitimate claim, then the defense of
qualified immunity would almost certainly be transformed into a
defense of absolute immunity. The Supreme Court recognized that a law
255
has to be only specific enough to be apparent to a reasonable person.
Certainly, the responsibility for keeping abreast of constitutional
developments within the law should rest on the shoulders of state actors.
Additionally, relying solely on intracircuit and Supreme Court cases to
establish a law without examining other circuit caselaw is excessively
formalistic.
Finally, the policy implications of recognizing the state-created
danger concept as clearly established law are significant. By recognizing
the state-created danger concept as clearly established law, both parties
will receive benefits. A potential victim of harm benefits through
enhanced police protection in any number of situations. The police will
benefit since they will not have to always question the propriety of their
action or inaction from situation to situation. Thus, the extensive
landscape of the pre-DeShaney and post-DeShaney caselaw implicates
that the state-created danger theory should be treated as clearly
256
established law.

See generally supraPart III.A.
M See generally supraPart ILA-B.
2N
See, e.g., Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1176 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The lack of any clearly
established duty to protect individuals outside of the custodial context is also reflected in
the law in the lower federal courts ....).
25 See supra note 242 (discussing the requirements of a "clearly established right").
256 See discussion supra Part III.A.
252
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Inconsistent Elements Within the Framework of the Different StateCreated Danger Tests

The actual framework for determining liability under the state257
created danger theory varies greatly among each of the ten circuits.
The tests announced range from adopting DeShaney's language almost
verbatim to elaborate and enumerated tests. 25 8 However, the ten circuits
have employed conflicting elements within each of their respective
tests.259 The most notable areas of conflict center on the following: (1)
whether a state actor creates a threat to a specific individual or the public
at large; (2) whether a state actor must have actual knowledge that a
dangerous environment exists; and (3) whether a plaintiff must be in
state or a state actor's custody when injury occurs at the hands of a third
260
party.
a.

The Specific Individual v. General Public Distinction

The state-created danger tests are inconsistent among the circuits as
to whether a state actor must create danger to a specific individual or the
general public. Of the ten circuits, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits require that a specific individual be placed in danger. 261 In
sharp contrast, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly stated that the specific
individual-general public distinction should not be made. 262 Finally, the
Second, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have remained silent on the

257 Joseph M. Pellicciotti, J.D., Annotation, "State-Created Danger," or Similar Theory, as
Basis for Civil Rights Action Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 159 A.L.R. FED. 37, 53 (2000).
2m5 See generally supra Part III.A (discussing the various state-created danger tests).
259 See generally supra Part III.A (discussing the various state-created danger tests).
260 See infra Part IV.B.2.a-c.
261 Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) (requiring
plaintiff to demonstrate that "[plaintiff] was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group"); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The
state must have known or clearly should have known that its actions specifically
endangered an individual."); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 913 (3d Cir.
1997) ("[T]he state is not obligated to protect its citizens from the random, violent acts of
private persons. But it does not appear this limitation necessarily restricts the scope of
§ 1983 to those instances where a specific individual is placed in danger."); Carlton v.
Cleburne County, Arkansas, 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that "conduct by
government officials directly responsible for placing particular individuals in a position of
danger" is necessary).
262 Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) ("When the police create a specific
danger, they need not know who in particular will be hurt. Some dangers are so evident,
while their victims are so random, that state actors can be held accountable by any injured
party.").
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issue. 263 Against this background, a state actor's liability may depend on
whether the relevant circuit has made the specific individual-general
public distinction.
The Seventh Circuit's position on refusing to make the specific
individual-general public distinction appears to be the most consistent
with the original intent behind § 1983.264 As the Seventh Circuit
indicated, if a state actor creates or disregards a specific danger, then that
state actor should be held accountable by any injured party. 265 Certainly,
the identity of a potential victim is not difficult to define when a danger
has the potential to affect many people (e.g., failing to remove a known
drunk driver from a highway or releasing a mentally ill patient into
society). Such a requirement would obligate a state actor to take
reasonable, preventive action to respond to a specific and known danger.
Additionally, a court should consider whether a danger poses an
immediate harm. By requiring a danger to be immediate, the potential
for state liability is narrowed since the danger would have a limited
range in time and scope. As a result, a harm far too attenuated would
not improperly inflict constitutional liability onto a state actor. At the
same time, such a requirement would remain faithful to § 1983's intent
and prior Supreme Court precedent by not necessarily requiring state
actors to have direct contact with a plaintiff.
Yet, merely creating or disregarding a situation that exposes an
individual or member of the general public to an obvious danger should
not be enough. The danger should also be foreseeable, rather than
requiring a foreseeable plaintiff. Although a state actor should have
sufficient contact with the plaintiff before liability attaches, liability can
be broadened to the general public if an obvious danger exists.
Therefore, the individual-general public distinction should not be made;
rather, courts should focus on whether a foreseeable danger exists.
b.

A State Actor's Knowledge of the Dangerous Environment

Closely related to the specific individual-general public distinction is
the question of whether a state actor must have actual knowledge of a

263 See discussion supra Part III.A.2-3.
264 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
treatment of the specific individual-general public distinction).
265 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
treatment of the specific individual-general public distinction).
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dangerous environment. In this context, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits have required a state actor to have actual knowledge
or be placed on notice of a danger facing a plaintiff.266 Additionally, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits do not require that a state actor have actual
knowledge or notice of a dangerous environment. 267 Finally, the Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have not commented on this issue. 268
Based on these holdings, it appears that a state actor should be
required to have actual knowledge of a particular danger before liability
attaches. Such a requirement balances the competing interests between a
state actor and a plaintiff. On the one hand, requiring a state actor to
have actual knowledge of a known danger prevents the government
from becoming the target of potentially unlimited liability by
unscrupulous plaintiffs. On the other hand, actual knowledge of a
specific danger reinforces a state actor's responsibility to properly
identify and respond to such harms. Such a conclusion is consistent with
§ 1983's spirit and intent. 269
Nonetheless, a state actor's awareness of a victim's plight may not
always be relevant to the state-created danger analysis. The DeShaney
opinion itself explicitly rejected the requirement of actual knowledge by
stating that it is not a state actor's knowledge of an individual's situation
that gives rise to a duty to protect. 270 Even the Fourth Circuit, which
refuses to accept the state-created danger concept as a legitimate theory,
acknowledged that DeShaney refused to require a state actor to have

266 McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The environment
created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must know it is dangerous.");
Robertson v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 229 F.3d 1136, 1136 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Absent such
notice, defendants cannot be held liable ... for having 'assisted in creating or increasing
danger."); Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066 ("The State must have known or clearly should have
known that its actions specifically endangered an individual."); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[Tihe harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly
direct."); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring plaintiff to
demonstrate that "[tlhe risk was obvious or known [by the state actor]").
267 Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[State actor]
acted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious danger in subjecting the
plaintiff to [the danger]."); Reed, 986 F.2d at 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[State actors] need not
know who in particular will be hurt.").
268 See supra Part III.A.1-3 (discussing the treatment of the knowledge issue in the Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).
269 See generally supra Part II for an overview of § 1983's legislative history.
270 See supra text accompanying note 50 (discussing DeShaney's reasoning).
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actual knowledge of a danger. 271 Instead, the focus should be on a state
actor's action or inaction and the resulting effects on a plaintiff. This
recognition is important because it essentially eliminates the specific
individual-general public distinction as well. That is, if a state actor does
not have knowledge of a specific danger, then it follows that the state
actor need not know who in particular will be hurt. Thus, based on the
circumstances, a court may not necessarily have to inquire as to whether
a state actor has actual knowledge of a danger.
c.

The Custody v. Non-Custody Distinction

Finally, there is intercircuit conflict as to whether a plaintiff bringing
a state-created danger claim must be in actual custody of a state or a state
actor. The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have explicitly
stated that actual custody is not required. 272 The D.C. Circuit stated that
"something less than physical custody" may be adequate. 273 In stark
contrast, the Eleventh Circuit stands alone in requiring actual custody to
exist before liability under the theory can be imposed.274 Finally, a
number of circuits have not commented on whether actual custody by a
state or a state actor is required before liability attaches. 275 Nonetheless,

271 See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit in Pinder
stated that DeSlhaney "rejected the idea that such a duty [to protect] can arise solely from an
official's awareness of a specific risk." Id.
272 McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We have recognized that, '[w]hen
state actors knowingly place a person in danger, the due process clause of the constitution
has been held to render them accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from their
conduct, whether or not the victim was in formal State custody.'"); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[Wie recognized that the state-created danger theory had
been utilized ...in non-custodial settings."); Reed, 986 F.2d at 1126 ("While we have been
hesitant to find section 1983 liability outside the custodial setting, we find that plaintiffs...
may state claims for civil rights violations ....) (citations omitted); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) ("This analysis establishes the possibility that a constitutional
duty to protect an individual against private violence may exist in a non-custodial
setting ...").
273 Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
274 Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir. 1997). The court noted,
By mandating school attendance, the State simply does not restrict a
student's liberty in the same sense that it does when it incarcerates
prisoners or when it commits mental patients involuntarily. Absent
that type of restraint, there can be no concomitant duty to provide for
the student's "safety and general well-being."
Id.
275 The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have not commented on this issue.
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it is worthy to note that the silent circuits have found liability outside of
276
state custody.
The Eleventh Circuit's position is problematic in light of § 1983's
legislative history, which does not require actual custody before liability
is imposed. 277 While the Eleventh Circuit's position is flawed, the thread
running through the other nine circuits offers persuasive guidance that
liability under the theory can be found in noncustodial contexts. 278
Rather than subscribing to a narrow and formalistic definition of custody
by looking only to the control itself, courts should eliminate the
custody/ non-custody distinction. Courts should not strictly look at the
form of the relationship between a state actor and a plaintiff. Instead,
courts should examine the extent to which a plaintiff has relied or
become dependent on a state actor's protection. 279
A person's reliance on a state actor's protection can be illustrated
when a state actor promises to offer an individual help or gives an
individual a false sense of security through action or inaction. A state
actor's declarations of intent to aid a person may hinder such an
individual's ability to act on his or her own behalf just as much as a
physical constraint in actual custody can. Rather than examining
custodial control itself, courts should look to the effects of the state actorplaintiff relationship. That is, courts should consider the underlying
dependency that mandates a state actor to respond to a danger instead of
276 See generally supra Part III for an account of the circuits' treatment of the custody
issue.
277 See supra Part II.A (discussing § 1983's legislative history).
278 See Blum, supra note 228, at 164-65. Blum argues,
Although DeShaney may be narrowly read to limit any affirmative
duty to protect to situations which "the state takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will," a number of lower
federal courts confronting the question have interpreted DeShaney to
recognize a duty to protect outside the contexts of imprisonment and
involuntary confinement in public institutions.
Id. (footnote omitted); Gary M. Bishop, Note, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution
to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1383 (1989) (recognizing that
"the state's direct physical control over an individual should not be the only situation in
which the state has a special duty to protect that individual," which is based on Justice
Brennan's dissent in DeShaney).
279 See Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1956 (1990). Huefner states that "[slome significant state limitation of
an individual's freedom, or some state assumption of significant caretaking responsibility,
seems to be a prerequisite for finding a relationship to be custodial." Id. Huefner further
notes that "it is the underlying dependency that actually obligates the state to act, not the
state's legal status as custodian." Id. at 1957.
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a state actor's status as an actual custodian. This framework also
comports with Justice Brennan's suggested analysis, which focuses on
280
the nature of the relationship between a state actor and a plaintiff.
Therefore, physical restraint should not be a necessary component of
custody under the state-created danger concept.
Although DeShaney plainly sought to circumvent a wholesale
expansion of the duty to protect, DeShaney's description of that duty
accommodates and appears to contemplate enforcement of the duty in
noncustodial settings. 281 As the Eighth Circuit 282 has pointed out, it is
significant that the majority in DeShaney decided to review the state's
actions in a noncustodial setting.283 Interestingly, the DeShaney opinion
expressly acknowledged, without deciding, that, if the state in that case
had exercised its power and placed Joshua DeShaney into a foster home,
that might constitute a custodial-type situation that could give rise to an
affirmative duty on the state to protect Joshua. 284 Accordingly, courts

2Mo See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's dissent in
DeShaney).
281 See Watkinson, supranote 26, at 1261 ("If the Supreme Court had intended custody to
exist only when the individual was incarcerated or institutionalized, the Court would not
have included the phrase 'other similar restraint' in its DeShaney opinion.").
282 Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990). The court noted,
To date the Supreme Court has found such a situation only in a
custodial setting. It is instructive, however, that in DeShaney the Court
considered it necessary to review the State's actions with regard to
Joshua's claim to determine whether the State had placed him in
greater danger or made him more vulnerable, even though he was in a
non-custodial setting. This analysis establishes the possibility that a
constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence
may exist in a non-custodial setting ....
Id.
283 See Huefner, supra note 279, at 1958. Huefner comments on DeShaney's treatment of
the custody/non-custody issue by stating that, "[b]ecause the Court's discussion includes
no recognition of non-custodial relationships, the decision aptly is characterized as
emphasizing custody, but it should not be read as thereby excluding the possibility of any
non-custodial analysis." Id.
24 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989).
The Court made the following observation:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua
from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its
agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty
to protect. Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held ... that the
State may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for failing to
protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of
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should not make the custody/ non-custody distinction when analyzing
state-created danger claims.
3.

Circuits That Have Placed Special Emphasis On Single Elements
Within Their Respective State-Created Danger Analyses

The inconsistencies stated in Part IV.B.2 illustrate the different
treatment of common elements among the varying state-created danger
tests. 2 5 Additionally, some circuits have placed special emphasis on
certain elements not always recognized by other circuits. 286 Not one of
these ten circuits share the same "key" element under their respective
28 7
tests.
Specifically, the Second Circuit's emphasis is grounded on the notion
that "the lack of any causal relationship" between a state actor and a
plaintiff's injuries will be "fatal" to a state-created danger claim. 288 The
Third Circuit has placed great emphasis on its "foreseeability"
element. 289
The Third Circuit has made the element absolutely
290
dispositive.
Next, the Sixth Circuit appears to have placed special
291
emphasis on requiring an anomalous "special danger" to be present.
The Tenth Circuit states that the "key" to the state-created danger
concept "lies in the state actor's culpable knowledge and conduct in
292
...
affirmatively placing an individual in a position of danger.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit states that the "key" requirement to impose
liability under the theory is "affirmative conduct" by a state actor who is
alleged to have increased or created the danger. 293 While all of these
circuits cite the same language from DeShaney, the different key

their foster parents. We express no view on the validity of this
analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case.
Id. (citations omitted).
285 See generally supra Part III.A (analyzing the circuits that have accepted the state-created
danger theory).
2S6 See generally supra Part III.A (analyzing the circuits that have accepted the state-created
danger theory).
287 See generally supra Part III.A (discussing "key" elements within the various statecreated danger tests).
m Cook v. Groton, No. 97-7307, 1997 WL 722936, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 19,1997).
289 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 913 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the
"primary focus when making this determination is foreseeability").
290 Id. at 914 (reasoning that the "ultimate test is one of foreseeability").
21 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998).
292 Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994)).
293 Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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elements only amplify the confusion surrounding the proper parameters
of the state-created danger concept. 294 From this, it is fairly inferable that
different emphases from different tests can lead to inconsistent judicial
results among the ten circuits. 295 This is especially true if the key element
is the single dispositive factor considered when deciding a state-created
danger claim.

4.

296

The Action-Inaction Distinction

The final level of judicial inconsistency among the ten circuits
recognizing the state-created danger concept involves the action-inaction
distinction. 297 Although the DeShaney majority and nine of the ten
circuits require affirmative action on the part of a state actor, such a
conclusion is wholly inconsistent with § 1983's legislative history and
298
prior Supreme Court precedent.

294 See, e.g., supra note 210 and accompanying text (recognizing the various
interpretations among the circuits).
295 See infra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of inconsistent circuit
caselaw).
296 See infra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of inconsistent circuit
caselaw).
297 See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 203 (3d ed.
1991). Professor Nahmod states that "[slome particularly troublesome substantive due
process issues are arising with increasing frequency in the circuits." Id. Specifically,
Professor Nahmod notes that "[t]hese cases involve the possible imposition of affirmative
duties upon local governments and their employees to prevent harm and even to rescue."
Id. See generally Colloquium, Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1561 (1993) (noting the general affect of the action-inaction
distinction by stating that "the action/inaction dichotomy of DeShaney might well affect
what conduct courts will consider to have created 'increased danger"'); Douthett, supra
note 52, at 645 (noting that ever since Monroe v. Pape was handed down by the Supreme
Court, "neglect, or inaction by State agencies has increasingly become a center of debate
among the federal courts of appeals").
298 See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 403-11. Professors Bodensteiner and
Levinson note that "many courts have expressed reluctance to impose damages on public
officials for sins of omission .
I..."
Id. at 403-04; Blum, supra note 228, at 211-12. Blum states
that "[gliven the variety and range of situations that may be covered by an affirmative duty
theory under the Due Process Clause, it is not surprising that the lower court opinions in
this area reflect a sense of confusion and a need for guidelines and principles beyond the
foundations poured in DeShaney." Blum, supra note 228, at 211-12; Colloquium, supra note
297, at 1560 (recognizing that DeShaney "adhered to a supposed distinction between
government action and inaction, with only the former being potentially subject to suit");
Eric W. Shulze & T.J. Martinez, Into the Snakepit: Section 1983 Liability Under the StateCreated Danger Theory for Acts of Private Violence at School, 104 ED. LAW. REP. 539, 545 (1995)
("'Liability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the state's affirmative
acts which work to plaintiffs' detriment in terms of exposure to danger."); Watkinson,
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Presently, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits require that the state actor take affirmative
action to create the dangerous environment. 299 However, a few preDeShaney Seventh Circuit opinions refused to make the action-inaction
distinction. 300 Yet, with debilitating ambiguity, the Seventh Circuit
30 1
appears to have ignored its prior caselaw on this issue.
In sharp contrast, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected affirmative
action as an element under its state-created danger test.30 2 The Third
Circuit only requires that the dangerous environment be "foreseeable"
by the state actor. 30 3 Significantly, the approach is understandable given
§ 1983's legislative history.30 4 However, echoing the reasoning of the
above circuits, it would appear that requiring affirmative action-as
opposed to inaction-on the part of a state actor would be appropriate

supra note 26, at 1280 ("It should be noted, however, that the state-created danger theory is
limited to cases where state officials take affirmative actions that create or exacerbate
danger to an individual.").
299 See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he key
element in the state-created danger theory is a determination that the state actor created the
danger to the plaintiff ....[W]e found no sufficiently culpable affirmative conduct ....
");
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Absent such affirmative
conduct by the State to endanger an individual, courts have rejected liability under a State
endangerment concept."); Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("The key to the state-created danger cases ...lies in the state actors' culpable
knowledge and conduct in affirmatively placing an individual in a position of
danger...."); Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998)
("[T]he danger-creation plaintiff must demonstrate, at the very least, that the state acted
affirmatively.
); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998)
("Liability under the state-created-danger theory is predicated upon affirmative acts by the
State ....); Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Those
circumstances are present when the state affirmatively acts to restrain an individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf.
); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[S]tate action that creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger .. ");
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We read the DeShaney Court's
analysis to imply that, though an allegation simply that police officers had failed to act
upon reports of past violence would not implicate the victim's rights under the Due
Process Clause ....); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[A]
constitutional duty to protect an individual against private violence may exist ... if the
state has taken affirmative action ....
).
'n
See supra Part III.A.2.c (discussing the action-inaction issue).
301 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the Seventh Circuit's inconsistent caselaw).
302 See supra Part III.A.3.a (discussing the Third Circuit's analysis).
303 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's treatment of
"foreseeability").
3N
See generally supraPart II.A for a historical account of § 1983.
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foreclosed by DeShaney's ambiguous dicta.
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This conclusion is not

Nonetheless, making the action-inaction distinction ignores the
straightforward and explicit command of § 1983's legislative history and
prior Supreme Court precedent. 30 7 What is absent from DeShaney and its
progenies' opinions is a discussion of § 1983's legislative history and
Supreme Court precedent, which addresses the original intent of
§ 1983.308 The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and prior
Court precedent should not be so easily cabined. 30 9
First, the spirit, intent, and purpose of § 1983's enactment was to
combat law enforcement inaction in the face of Klan terrorism in the postCivil War South. 310 It belies reality to contend that the evils springing
from affirmative state action are any different from the evils springing
from intentional state inaction.311 The evils of inaction in the context of

305 See generally supra Part II.A for a historical account of § 1983.

But compare Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361-62 (1992) (commenting on
DeShaney and suggesting that it could easily be argued that the DSS "'by the affirmative
exercise of its power,' did in fact 'restrain' Joshua's 'liberty' while 'failing to provide for his
basic human need[]' for 'reasonable safety"') (alteration in original).
307 See generally supra Part II.A for a historical account of § 1983.
308 See also Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078, 1082 (1990) (noting that the DeShaney "brief and formalistic
opinion belies the difficulty of issues" contained with the case).
M9
See generally supra Part II.A for a historical account of § 1983.
310
See Soifer, supra note 53, at 1524. Soifer sets forth the following with regard to the
intent of § 1983:
Section 1983 was primarily intended to interpose federal protection
against unconstitutional state action, whether done by the state
legislatures or by state judges or by executive branch officials ....
[Tihe relevant speeches in Congress and the historical context of the
1860s and early 1870s make clear that "deliberate inactivity" by state
and local officials, in the face of brutal depredations, was a central
concern of the post-Civil War period.
Id.(footnote omitted).
3"
Although outside the scope of this Note, the "negative rights theory" should be briefly
mentioned at this point. This theory interprets the Constitution as a document of negative
rights. See BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 457. Professors Bodensteiner and
Levinson note that "[it is well-established that the Due Process Clause simply imposes
limitations on government action, but does not mandate any type of affirmative
obligations, i.e., the Constitution is a 'charter of negative rather than positive liberties."' Id.;
NAHMOD, supra note 297, at 205. Professor Nahmod argues that "[aifter DeShaney, it is
clear that the Court has adopted the view that the Constitution is 'a charter of negative
liberties,' at least with regard to substantive due process." NAHMOD, supra note 297, at 205;
see also MacNaughton, supra note 192, at 754. MacNaughton argues that state inaction,
306
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post-Civil War Klan terrorism do not significantly differ from the
numerous types of evils in the modem era.312 The underpinnings of the
Third Circuit and several pre-DeShaney Seventh Circuit approaches to
the action-inaction distinction at least acknowledge the pitfalls of reading
313
too much into the distinction.

"even in the face of extreme injury or indifference by state actors, is not a morally culpable
deprivation of liberty by the government," and, therefore, should not be the basis of a statecreated danger claim. MacNaughton, supra note 192, at 754. Indeed, negative rights
theorists often point to Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit language as found in DeShaney
when explaining this theory: "The men who framed the original Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment were worried about government's oppressing the citizenry rather
than about its failing to provide adequate social services." DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987). However, succinctly put,
such a theory is inherently flawed and should not have been used to prevent liability for
intentional state inaction. See generally Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th
Cir. 1988) (commenting that, even though the Seventh Circuit has championed the negative
rights theory per Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook noted that "[tihe Supreme Court
sometimes uses the negative rights of the Constitution as the foundation for positive
ones"); Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the
Inadequate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S.CAL. L. REV. 1295, 1306
(1995). Browne makes the following observation with regard to the action-inaction issue:
[The] assumption that the government can deprive individuals of
protected rights only by its actions does not take into account
government's pervasive influence through regulatory action and
inaction, its displacement of private remedies, and indeed, its
monopolies

over

some

avenues

of relief

....

In

short,

[the

government] can harm by its ostensible omissions, as seriously as, and
often more efficiently than, by its direct, tangible actions.
Brown, supra (alteration in original) (quoting Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2283-84 (1990)); see also MacNaughton, supra note 192, at
781; Soifer, supra note 53, at 1524 ("Posner's ahistorical fallacy is even less convincing about
the immediate post-Civil War period ....Sponsors and supporters of these acts repeatedly
emphasized the federal duty to provide protection when State officials invaded or failed to
protect the full and equal rights of all citizens."). MacNaughton argues that the
courts must abandon the negative rights rhetoric in order to provide a
remedy to victims of administrative malfeasance or neglect .... The
strict negative rights view is a type of legal fiction: It is an artificial
structure, only loosely based on ethical and historical traditions, set up
purely for the sake of convenience .... A semantic flick of the wrist
transforms government neglect of civil rights into 'blameless' inaction.
MacNaughton, supra note 192, at 781.
312 See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (discussing the history of § 1983).
313 See Madden, supra note 22, at 970-71. Madden notes the following with regard to the
Third Circuit's treatment of the action-inaction issue:
Although it was not necessary for the Morse court to determine
whether omissions are included in the fourth requirement of the statecreated danger theory, this dicta is important because it allows a
broader ranger of State conduct to be brought under scrutiny. No
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A further impediment in making the action-inaction distinction lies
in the brushing aside of the Supreme Court's decisions in Monroe and
Monell.314 Significantly, the cases emphasize the legislative history
surrounding § 1983.315 In addition, as the Court in Monell stated, a
proper regard for § 1983's genesis requires that § 1983 be broadly
construed because it was enacted as a remedial measure. 316 Yet, with
sweeping consequences, the Court blatantly ignored its precedent when
317
deciding DeShaney.
Understood in this way, the action-inaction distinction is
fundamentally flawed and bears no connection to § 1983's legislative
history nor prior Supreme Court precedent. 318 An appropriate standard
should not require a distinction to be made between a state actor's action
or inaction. 319 In fact, situations could arise where a state actor's
involvement, through action or inaction, could create a dependency that
gives rise to further responsibility on the part of a state actor. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent in DeShaney, intentional inaction by a state

longer does the State have to affirmatively act to create the danger;
instead, inaction may be enough, as long as the omission was
deliberate and the harm was foreseeable.
Id.
314 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Monroe and
Monell).
315 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Monroe and
Monell).
316 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing Monell's reasoning).
317 See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 167, 173 (1989). It
has been argued that the
Court's endorsement [in DeShaney] of the arbitrary dichotomy between
action and inaction obscured the very real impact that the DSS had on
Joshua's life. Drawing a line between a set of "active" and "passive"
government behaviors, and assigning constitutional protection
accordingly, is a random exercise guided neither by legal directive nor
by judicial precedent. Indeed, although the majority contended that
the state "stood by and did nothing," it could just as easily have
treated the agency's failure to protect Joshua as the active, if reckless,
management of a case in which it was deeply involved.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
318 See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael L. Wells, Government Inaction as a ConstitutionalTort:
DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 109 n.9 (1991) (recognizing that "the
distinction between acts and omissions often turns on how one poses the question").
319 See supra Part IV.B.4 (analyzing the action-inaction issue).
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can be just as abusive and oppressive. 320 In short, the action-inaction
distinction is a classic example of a distinction without a difference.
C. The IntracircuitConflict Within the Second and Seventh Circuits
The final level of judicial inconsistency involving the state-created
danger theory involves intracircuit conflict within the Second and
Seventh Circuits. 321 The added variation of inconsistency only further
complicates the differing elaborations of the theory among the ten
circuits recognizing its legitimacy. Although not widespread among the
ten circuits, it is troubling that the Second and Seventh Circuits have
ignored their own precedent in the context of the state-created danger
concept. 322 Curiously, the intracircuit conflict surrounds the previously
323
discussed action-inaction distinction.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Dwares stated that a state actor who
"fails to act upon past violence" does not incur liability under the statecreated danger theory. 324 This language seems to indicate the need for
affirmative state action rather than inaction. However, in Cook, the
Second Circuit made no mention of requiring affirmative action on the

320 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan believed that state inaction could be just as abusive as state
action when he argued that "[iun a constitutional setting that distinguishes sharply between
action and inaction, one's characterization of the misconduct alleged under § 1983 may
effectively decide the case." Id. Justice Brennan further argued that his "disagreement
with the Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can be every bit as abusive of
power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then
ignores it." Id. at 212; see also Browne, supra note 311, at 1306 ("The holding of DeShaney
seems so unjust because it allows the State to stand back and let its citizens be harmed or
killed when the State is aware of the danger and could easily bring an end to it. DeShaney
offends basic expectations of governmental protection."); Stern, supra note 55, at 1282.
Regarding the action-inaction distinctions made by the DeShaney majority, Stem notes the
following:
If it is true that the due process clause was designed to prevent
oppression, it is an affront to our basic notions of life and liberty to
hold that a state which assumes responsibility for protecting an abused
child, and then disclaims that responsibility after causing further harm,
amounts to nothing less than an oppressive exercise of governmental
power.
Stem, supra note 55, at 1282 (footnotes omitted).
321 See supraPart III.A.2.a, c (discussing the Second and Seventh Circuits' treatment of the
state-created danger theory).
322 See supra Part III.A.2.a, c (discussing the Second and Seventh Circuits' treatment of the
state-created danger theory).
323 See supra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the action-inaction issue).
324 See supra Part III.A.2.a (analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion in Dwares).
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part of a state actor. 325 Rather, the court focused only on the "causal
relationship" between a state actor and the ultimate harm suffered by a
plaintiff.326 It would appear that if the harm caused was a foreseeable
and fairly direct result of a state actor's inactions, then liability could be
imposed. Thus, "causal relationship" seems to imply that it might be
possible to establish a chain of causation between a state actor's inaction
and a danger. However, the Second Circuit left this riddle unanswered.
The Seventh Circuit also appears to have taken an inconsistent
position on the action-inaction issue.327 In White, a pre-DeShaney opinion,
the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to make the action-inaction
distinction.328 Likewise, in Bowers, another pre-DeShaney opinion, the
Seventh Circuit pointed out that the line between an affirmative act and
an omission is often difficult to draw. 329 However, in Dykema, Monfils,
and Reed, all post-DeShaney opinions, 330 the Seventh Circuit speaks of
331
affirmative state action rather than inaction.
Against this background, it is fair to say that the Seventh Circuit has
fashioned conflicting caselaw. Perhaps most troubling about the Seventh
Circuit's post-DeShaney opinions is that they mechanically cite White and
Bowers without taking into account the positions in White and Bowers on
In his dissent, Justice Brennan even
the action-inaction issue.332
recognized that the majority's opinion in DeShaney was contrary to
White.333 Plainly, the Seventh Circuit brushed aside these prior holdings

325 See supra Part III.A.2.a (analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion in Cook).
326 See supra Part III.A.2.a (analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion in Cook).
327 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the action-inaction issue in the
Seventh Circuit).
328 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
White).
329 See supra note 84 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Bowers).
330 See supra Part III.A.2.c.
331 See Soifer, supra note 53, at 1528. Soifer criticizes DeShaney and post-DeShaney Seventh
Circuit cases by stating that § 1983 was
intended to afford broad protection from the Ku Klux Klan and from
inaction by State officials in the face of Klan outrages [and] was clearly
not limited to affirmative State action. Because Posner and Rehnquist
dislike the implications of this Statute, however, they take it upon
themselves to transform it to be true to the logical implications of what
they think it should have said.
Id.
332 See supra note 84 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's opinions in White and Bowers).
333 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 205 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in White v.
Rochford and stated that "[clases from the lower courts also recognize that a State's actions
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without directly overruling them. 334 Thus, seduced by DeShaney's
ambiguous dicta, it is constitutionally disingenuous for the Second and
335
Seventh Circuits to ignore their precedents.
The DeShaney opinion is, of course, the controlling authority for
determining whether a § 1983 claim is stated under the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. 336 However, the state-created
danger concept is based on a limited quote, in dicta, which was not
decisive to the DeShaney opinion. 337 The Second and Seventh Circuits
should have at least clarified their post-DeShaney holdings concerning
the action-inaction issue, especially regarding the Seventh Circuit's
treatment of its precedent. 338 To introduce such an arbitrary position
without explanation hardly seems consonant with the policy of stare
decisis.
Accordingly, the various intercircuit and intracircuit
inconsistencies illustrate why the following proposed judicial test is
339
needed when courts analyze state-created danger claims.

can be decisive in assessing the constitutional significance of subsequent inaction. For
these purposes, moreover, actual physical restraint is not the only state action that has been
considered relevant." Id. (citations omitted).
334 See Blum, supra note 107, at 464. Blum examines the vast inconsistencies within the
Seventh Circuit and makes the following observation:
The court's reasoning in Reed underscores the confusion endangered
by any theory that turns "on the tenuous metaphysical construct which
differentiates sins of omission and commission" .... Rather than
focusing upon the affirmative nature of the conduct involved, the
courts should ask whether the [state actor's] acts or omissions were the
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and if so, whether such acts or
omissions reflected the requisite level of culpability to constitute a
constitutional violation.
Id.
335 See supra Part III.A.2.a, c for the Second and Seventh Circuits' approaches to statecreated danger claims.
336 See generally supra Part II.B (discussing DeShaney).
337 See supra note 6 (discussing DeShaney's dicta, which forms the basis of the statecreated danger concept).
338 See supra Part III.A.2.c for the Seventh Circuit's approach to state-created danger
claims.
339 See supra Part III.A.2.c for the Seventh Circuit's approach to state-created danger
claims.
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TESTS

This Part proposes a model judicial analysis for courts to apply when
they evaluate state-created danger claims. 34° A uniform approach will
eliminate the widespread and debilitating confusion that currently exists
among the federal circuits. 341
A.

Distortions of History and Precedent: DeShaney and the Recently
ProposedRestrictive Approach to State-CreatedDanger Claims

Currently, as illustrated in the DeShaney decision, the Supreme Court
appears to favor a restrictive approach to the state-created danger
theory. 342 In pursuit of this end, a comprehensive test has recently been
proposed by a constitutional commentator in an attempt to unify the
federal circuits. 343 The proposed test attempts to clarify the ambiguities
within DeShaney and its progeny. 344 Like the current Court's approach,
the recently proposed test argues for a very narrow and restrictive
345
approach to state-created danger claims.
Nonetheless, the test fails to provide a workable solution consistent
with § 1983's legislative history, prior Supreme Court precedent, and the
approach taken by a majority of the federal circuits. For example, the
test imposes liability only when a state actor affirmatively acts rather
than refusing to act.346 The difficulty with this requirement is that it
disavows the original intent of § 1983's legislative history and the

See infra Part V.B for the proposed judicial test.
See generally Cross, supra note 215, at 1249. Indeed, circuit splits often lead to
"confusion and unequal treatment of citizens living in different judicial districts." Id.;
Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit
Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 700 (1995). When one circuit refuses to recognize and
follow precedent of another circuit, then "disuniformity" within the federal law inevitably
results. Id.
342 See Cantwell, supra note 31, at 344. Cantwell notes that the "current Court is far more
likely to narrow the scope of the 'danger creation' exception." Id.
343 Kernodle, supra note 84, at 187-203.
344 See generally supra Parts 11.B, III, IV.
345 Kernodle, supra note 84, at 197. The proposed test argues that "the lack of unity and
the need for confinement demands that the Supreme Court clarify and create a unified
standard that narrows the state-created danger theory to appropriate cases." Id. The
proposed test sets forth the following elements: (1) affirmative act; (2) specific plaintiff or
specific group of plaintiffs; (3) culpability; (4) causation; and (5) the overall situation shocks
the conscience of the court. Id. at 187-94.
346
Id. at 187-88.
340
341
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Court's holdings in Monroe and Monell.347 The action-inaction distinction
can be difficult to make under certain circumstances. 348 Also, this
seemingly straight-forward inquiry has proved to be an enigma,
349
resulting in sharp circuit conflict.
Furthermore, the proposed judicial test requires that the state action
be directed "toward a specific plaintiff or group of plaintiffs, rather than
toward the public at large." 35 0 However, the difficulty with this
requirement is that DeShaney never set forth such a restrictive
distinction.351 Significantly, as the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Reed, the
controlling concern is that "[s]ome dangers are so evident, while their
victims are so random, that state actors can be held accountable by any
injured party." 352 In short, the thrust of the proposed test appears only
to offer an illusionary remedy based on an irresistible urge to reinforce
DeShaney's ambigious dicta. 353 The practical effect of the proposal,
therefore, is to leave the scope of the state-created danger issue just as
clouded as DeShaney left it.
B.

The Proposed Hybridization: A Return to the Original Understanding of
§ 1983

As Parts III and IV illustrate, the various circuit inconsistencies
expose the Supreme Court's failure to adequately guide the lower courts
on how to evaluate § 1983 claims. 354 The plain implication of § 1983's
legislative history, prior Supreme Court precedent, and a majority of the
355
circuits require that state-created danger claims be broadly construed.
Therefore, this Note proposes a unified and expansive approach to statecreated danger claims. To establish a prima facie state-created danger

37 See generally supra Parts II.A, IV.B.4 (discussing § 1983's legislative history and the
Supreme Court's holdings in Monroe and Monell).
Ws See supraPart IV.B.4 (analyzing the action-inaction issue).
349 See supraPart IV.B.4 (analyzing the action-inaction issue).
350 Kernodle, supranote 84, at 189.
351 See supraPart IV.B.2.a (discussing the specific individual-general public distinction).
352 Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see also supra
notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Reed).
353 Kernodle, supra note 84, at 200 (stating that "the Court would support a test that
restricts liability under the state-created danger theory").
354 See generally supra Parts III, IV for a complete discussion and analysis of the federal
circuit courts' decisions regarding the state-created danger theory.
355 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing how constitutional
commentators have argued for a broad interpretation of § 1983).
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claim under this Note's proposed judicial test, the plaintiff must show
that
(1) a state actor creates, increases, or disregards;
(2) a foreseeable or known danger;
(3) through action or inaction;
(4) to a specific individual or members of the general public;
(5) regardless of whether the injured plaintiff was in actual state
custody; and
(6) the state actor's overall actions or inactions shock the conscience
or were done with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's safety.
First, element (1)'s "state actor" requirement is required by all of the
circuits acknowledging the existence of the state-created danger concept;
35 6
this requirement is mandated by § 1983's plain language.
Additionally, element (1) is satisfied not only when a state actor creates
or increases a danger to a plaintiff, but also when a state actor disregards
a danger. 357 Imposing liability on a state actor for disregarding a danger
is consistent with the test's expansive approach to state-created danger
claims. Intentionally disregarding a danger should not be treated any
differently from a danger that is created or increased. Disregarding a
danger is intimately related to elements (3) and (4). First, disregarding a
danger can be characterized as either action or inaction under element
(3). Also, disregarding a danger must be gauged against the culpability
requirement under element (4).
Element (2) of the proposed test requires that the danger produced
by a third party be "foreseeable" or "known" by a state actor. This
element is not met unless a state actor has actual knowledge of the
358
impending harm and a causal link can be traced to the ultimate harm.
However, the lack of actual knowledge may not always be fatal to a
state-created danger claim. 359 Although the proposed model offers an
expansive approach to state-created danger claims, element (2) is

See supra note 18 (stating § 1983's text).
See supra Part III.A.3.c (recognizing the Tenth Circuit's requirement that a state actor
act with "conscious disregard" of a danger).
358 See supra Part IV.B.2.b (analyzing a state actor's knowledge of a danger).
3-9 See supra Part IV.B.2.b (suggesting that actual knowledge may not always be
required).
356
357

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss1/3

D.: Failing to Provide Police Protection: Breeding a Viable and Cons

236

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

sufficiently narrow in scope so as not to demand that a state actor be
expected to protect every potential harmful act caused by private
parties. 360 This requirement is also consistent with § 1983's ultimate goal
361
of deterring civil rights violations committed by state actors.
Concomitantly, this element essentially obliviates the oft-difficult action362
inaction distinction as well.
Specifically, element (3) expressly prohibits courts from making the
superfluous and troublesome action-inaction distinction. 363 Element (3)
acknowledges the concerns voiced by § 1983's legislative history, prior
Supreme Court precedent, and various federal circuit courts. 364 That is,
the harm resulting from a state actor's inaction can be just as harmful
and appalling as an affirmative act.
Under element (3), a state actor is only liable if the state actor's acts
or omissions increased the risk of injury beyond what it would have
been had the state actor not intervened at all. Even though element (3)
conflicts with the positions of a majority of the circuits recognizing the
state-created danger theory, it promotes a more balanced approach.
Rather than examining whether affirmative conduct occurred from the
state actor's perspective, element (3) would require a court to examine
the actions or inactions of a state actor through the lens of the plaintiff.
For instance, a police officer's assurances of safety from a plaintiff's
perspective could reasonably be construed as "action" rather than
Such assurances might enhance a plaintiff's feeling of
"inaction."
invulnerability and alter his or her behavior in a manner that would
result in an increased exposure to a danger. Therefore, element (3)
recognizes the inherent difficulties and unfairness in making the actioninaction distinction.
Finally, element (3) is also rooted in § 1983's language of extending
liability to any person who "subjectis], or causes[s] [a person] to be
subjected" to constitutional violations. 365 By refusing to make the actioninaction distinction, element (3) answers the question as to how a state

360 See supra Part IV.B.2.b (analyzing a state actor's knowledge of a danger).
361 See generally supra Part II.A (discussing § 1983's legislative history).
362 See supra Part IV.B.4 (analyzing the action-inaction issue).
363 See supra Part IV.B.4 (analyzing the action-inaction issue).
364 See generally supra Parts ILA, III, IV.B.4 for information concerning the treatment of
the action-inaction issue by § 1983's legislative history, prior Supreme Court precedent, and
the various federal circuits.
365 See supra note 18 for § 1983's text.
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actor "causes [a person] to be subjected" to a constitutional
deprivation. 366 Certainly, "subjecting" or "causing" can be interpreted to
establish a possible causal link to state inaction. Also, this element
incorporates the Seventh Circuit's observation in White by refusing to
make the "tenuous metaphysical construct which differentiates sins of
omission and commission." 367 In other words, making the distinction
between action and inaction can be notoriously difficult for courts.
In a similar vein, element (4) does not require courts to make a
distinction between a specific individual and members of the general
public. 368 Like the action-inaction distinction, the line between a specific
369
plaintiff and a member of the general public can often be unclear.
More importantly, a danger in some circumstances can be so obvious to
a state actor that contact between the state actor and an injured plaintiff
370
should not be required.
Next, element (5) does not require that an injured plaintiff be in
actual state custody before a state-created danger claim can be
asserted. 371 With the exception of the Eleventh Circuit, this element is
consistent with the other nine circuits that refuse to require a plaintiff to
be in actual state custody before liability under the theory can be
372
imposed.
More importantly, the Court's decision in DeShaney should not be
read as excluding the possibility of any noncustodial analysis. 373 Even
though DeShaney includes some nonrecognition of noncustodial contexts,
the Court's opinion on this issue is so ambiguous that it is impossible to
tell whether the Court would reject all noncustodial relationships. 374 As
such, this Note recognizes that the concept of "custody" within DeShaney
is not so rigid as to be defined only in terms of a prison or mental facility.

366 See supra note 18 for § 1983's text.
367 White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979); see also supra note 84 (discussing
the Seventh Circuit's decision in White).
3M See supra Part IV.B.2.a (analyzing the specific individual-general public distinction).
369 See supra Part IV.B.2.a (analyzing the specific individual-general public distinction).
370 See supra Part IV.B.2.a (analyzing the specific individual-general public distinction).
371 See supra Part IV.B.2.c (discussing the custody issue).
372 See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's treatment
of the custody issue).
373 See supra notes 278, 283 and accompanying text (discussing DeShaney's interpretation
of custody).
374 See supra notes 278, 283 and accompanying text (discussing DeShaney's interpretation
of custody).
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Theoretically, any inquiry into either custodial or noncustodial contexts
would ask the same questions concerning the extent of the state's role in
375
creating the danger.
Finally, element (6) is required in varying degrees by all of the
circuits recognizing the state-created danger theory. 376 Element (6)'s
heightened culpability requirement prevents unscrupulous plaintiffs
from transforming and elevating any garden variety tort into a
constitutional tort under the theory. 377 As a result, this Note is respectful
of DeShaney's attempt to protect the government from unlimited liability
under § 1983.378 Such an expansion of government liability would most
likely carry a heavy price. Therefore, element (6) attempts to strike a
balance between the competing values involved when appraising
government liability.
Additionally, fears that every tort would be transformed into a
constitutional violation would be put to rest by the "shocks the
conscience" or "deliberate indifference" standard. 379
This Note
recognizes that lines can be drawn between negligent acts that are state
tort violations and deliberate acts that may be brought under § 1983.380
Therefore, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate
that a state actor not only knew of the likelihood that the plaintiff faced a
danger but also that the state actor intentionally acted recklessly in
381
preventing that danger.
Accordingly, while the proposed test broadens the scope of the statecreated danger concept, from another perspective, the scope is narrowed
by the heightened culpability requirement. 382 The heightened culpability

375 See supra Part IV.B.2.c (discussing the custody issue).
376 See Kernodle, supra note 84, at 185. Kernodle makes the following observation
concerning the culpability requirement of state actors under the state-created danger
theory:
[AlIl courts require the state actor to have some level of culpability
regarding his act that led to the plaintiff's harm in order for the
government to be liable ....
In light of these holdings, most courts
require a plaintiff to show that the government official acted with
deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.
Id.
377 See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
378 See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
379 See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
380 See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
381 See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
382
See supra Part IV.A.1 (analyzing the heightened culpability standard).
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standard should be able to satisfy the concerns of DeShaney and the First
and Fourth Circuits by requiring that a state actor stop and think before
acting in a manner that may lead to a loss of liberty. Protection against
unlimited government liability does not require an extension of
DeShaney's restrictive language since the "shocks the conscience" or the
"deliberate indifference" standards distinguish more clearly between
state tort claims and wrongs reaching constitutional dimensions.
C.

Application of the ProposedJudicial Test

Applying the proposed judicial test to the introductory hypotheticals
of this Note 383 illustrates that both Mary and Michelle Jones would be
successful in asserting a state-created danger claim against the respective
state actors. First, the harm tragically experienced by Mary was a
foreseeable consequence and directly related to the police officers'
inaction in the face of a known danger. In fact, Mary might assert that
the police officers' assurances that she would not get shot by MC were
"action" rather than "inaction." Clearly, a causal connection exists
between the officers' omissions and Mary's injuries. From Mary's point
of view, she may have relied on the officers' statements and altered her
behavior in such a way that exposed her to greater danger by increasing
her exposure to MC's violent actions. Mary is also a specific individual
with whom the state actors had sufficient contact-even though such a
status is irrelevant under the proposed judicial test. In addition, the lack
of official state custody is also irrelevant. Finally, the police officers
intentionally failed to act in the face of danger, which can only be
described as "deliberate indifference."
Next, in Michelle Jones' case, it was foreseeable that the police
officer's act of abandoning Michelle in a threatening part of the city
during a late hour would expose her to danger. Michelle is a specific
individual who had sufficient contact with the police officer; however,
the contact is irrelevant since the foreseeable danger was so obvious.
Also, similar to Mary's situation, the lack of official state custody in
Michelle's case is irrelevant. Under the lens of the proposed test, the
extent of the state actor's involvement of disregarding the danger would
be examined the same in either a noncustodial or custodial context.
Finally, the police officer's actions rise to the extreme level of willfully
disregarding Michelle's safety, which "shocks the conscience."

W

See supra Part I for a factual description of the hypotheticals.
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D. The Suggested Adoption and Implicationsof the ProposedJudicial Analysis
The failure of the Supreme Court to provide adequate guidance in
DeShaney leaves unclear the proper approach to state-created danger
claims. Federal circuit courts have struggled in their attempts to
construct the appropriate parameters for such claims by extrapolating
from the ambiguous language within the DeShaney decision. The
Supreme Court in DeShaney denied § 1983 liability under the facts of that
case, leaving open questions as to what facts would establish such a
theory. As indicated, this Note sets aside the Court's decision in
DeShaney and examines the scope of the problem from a fresh
perspective. If, however, the Court did not intend for the language in
DeShaney to be translated into a § 1983 theory of recovery, the Court
should reconsider and embrace the interpretations that have been
advanced by this Note and by many of the federal circuits.
Significantly, the proposed judicial test advanced by this Note
rigidifies the constitutional framework and prevents the evolution of
inconsistent tests within the federal circuits. This Note's recommended
judicial test requires finer guidelines than the clouded dicta provided by
DeShaney.
Although the future trajectory of the Court's § 1983
jurisprudence indicates that the Court will probably continue to apply its
restrictive approach, there is a wealth of authority supporting the
expansive approach as set forth by this Note. Given the widespread
circuit confusion, it makes sense to go back to the origins of § 1983 and
the holdings in Monroe and Monell.
Furthermore, the utility of the proposed judicial test is not limited to
§ 1983 claims involving state actors who are police officers. The
implications of the proposed judicial test can be projected into other
areas of § 1983 jurisprudence. The explosive potential of the proposed
judicial test would provide instructive guidance for the growing
catalogue of different state-created danger situations. Although outside
the scope of this Note, the potpourri of situations include: failing to
provide a safe environment in the prison context; 384 domestic violence
cases involving child abuse and battered spouses; 385 foster care

384 See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (discussing a prison guard's
failure to protect a prisoner from the attack of other inmates).
385 See generally Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the police had an unconstitutional policy for failing to provide more police protection to
victims of domestic assaults).
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matters; 386 internet supervision;387 public housing and employment
389
contexts; 388 and liability involving school officials.
VI. CONCLUSION

As this Note demonstrates, no clear constitutional standard exists for
analyzing state-created danger claims under § 1983 jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court's current interpretation of § 1983 claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment is exceedingly narrow.
With debilitating
ambiguity, the Court's decision in DeShaney leaves many unanswered
questions within the law. By narrow judicial construction, many of the
federal courts have amplified DeShaney's ambiguities. Uniformity is
needed to end the legal uncertainty and foster an approach to prevent
further intercircuit and intracircuit conflict.
The proposed judicial test advanced by this Note attempts to strike a
workable balance among § 1983's legislative history, prior Supreme
Court precedent, and various circuit court caselaw. At the same time,
the proposed judicial test prevents both the transformation of garden
variety torts into constitutional torts and other abuses committed by
unscrupulous plaintiffs.
Significantly, the policies behind § 1983
mandate an expansive approach to state-created danger claims rather
than a restrictive approach. Although the specific exigencies of postCivil War Reconstruction no longer exist today, comparative evils are
committed by present-day state actors and threaten our civil liberties in a
variety of other forms.
Matthew D. Barrett*

See Blum, supra note 228, at 167 ("Indeed, the lower federal courts that have ruled on
this issue since DeShaney have uniformly recognized a constitutional right to protection
from unnecessary harm on the part of foster children involuntarily placed by the state in a
foster care situation.").
37
See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The
court held that "[a] library does not 'affirmatively plac[e]' minors in danger by allowing
them unsupervised use of computers which are linked to the internet." Id.
38'
See Blum, supra note 228, at 188 ("Courts have not been receptive to an affirmative
duty under the Due Process Clause to protect persons living in public housing or those
employed by a public employer.").
389 See generally VACCA & HUDGINS, supra note 31.
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